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Introduction
In September 2008, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
announced the United States' intention to join Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei,
and Chile in what was then called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partner-
ship Agreement, a preferential trade agreement.' Since then, the agreement has
grown in scope and ambition. The negotiations to create what is now known as
* © 2014 Genevieve Tung. The author is Reference Librarian, Rutgers School of
Law - Camden, New Jersey.
I Press Release, United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partners and
United States Launch FTA Negotiations (Sept. 22, 2008). The agreement was first
commonly known as the "Pacific 4" or "P4" agreement. See Peter K. Yu, TPP and
Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1129, 1130 (2014).
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the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have expanded to include seven other
nations. 2 The USTR wants the TPP to be "an ambitious, next-generation, Asia-
Pacific trade agreement that reflects U.S. economic priorities and values.?'
According to the USTR's webpage dedicated to the agreement, the administra-
tion is ''working in close partnership with Congress and with a wide range of
stakeholders, in seeking to conclude a strong agreement that addresses the issues
that u.s. businesses and workers are facing in the 21st century.'"
During this time the USTR has described the TPP negotiating process as
one of "unprecedented" transparency. In addition to soliciting the views of its
advisors from the private sector, the agency has also extended invitations to
"[r]epresentatives from academia, labor unions, the private sector, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations from around the world" to visit the sites of negotiating
rounds and make presentations to the delegates.' Some journalists, academics,
activists, and politicians, however, are critical of the USTR's approach to
transparency and have characterized its information-sharing policies as mere
posturing," or "transparency theater.?' As one critic pointed out, the promise of
'transparency' is that the governed have a clear view of what their government is
doing, as opposed to the mere offer of a forum in which to share their opinions.'
These complaints are largely based on USTR's refusal to share drafts of the
agreement as well as its insistence on binding all negotiating parties to secrecy."
Despite these efforts, multiple sections of the draft agreement have been leaked
online:°
2 Australia,Canada, Japan, Malaysia,Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam.
3 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE UNITED STATES IN THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/factsheets/2011 /
november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Jul. 24, 2014).
4 Id
5 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DIRECT STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/direct-stakholder-engagement (last visited Jul. 24, 2014).
6 See, e.g., Finlay Lewis, Demandfor Transparency in Trade Talks Masks Broader
Skepticism, CQ WEEKLY, Jul. 29,2013, at 1318.
7 Margot E. Kaminski, The U.S. Trade Representative's Democracy Problem: The
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) as a Juncture for International Law-
making in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 519, 523 (2012) (referring
to the USTR's role in negotiatingthe Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement).
8 See Sherwin Siy, TPP and a Very Basic Point About Transparency, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE (May 14, 2012), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-bloglblogs/tpp-
and-very-basic-point-about-transparency ("So long as no actual proposed text comes to
light. ..the process remains opaque, and no amount of input from whatever stakeholders
into the TPP process makes up for a lack of real informationflowing the other way.").
9 See Yu, supra note 1, at 1131.
10 See notes 263-264, infra, and accompanyingtext.
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The controversy surrounding the TPP is only the most recent example of
how transparency and information policy can eclipse other issues in trade
diplomacy. Almost twenty years ago, negotiations to create a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAl) became the focus of heated resistance among a
range of groups that feared that the treaty would elevate business interests above
state sovereignty, the environment, labor, and local culture. I I This resistance
was catalyzed by early netroots organizing and the publication of a leaked draft
of the agreement on the Intemet.l" The eventual failure of the MAl was an
important precedent for the large-scale globalization protests of the late 1990s, as
well as the eventual liberalization of the classification and information sharing
policies of intergovernmental organizations like the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Closed-door bilateral and regional trade agreement negotiating practices
have become increasingly controversial over the same time period. The talks
organized around the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) were both punctuated by demands for
publication of draft texts and negotiating agendas, as well as increased access to
the negotiations by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the press. 13
Can international diplomacy be unprecedentedly transparent while at the
same time being undemocratic, perhaps even captive to private interests? The
disputes surrounding the negotiations of the MAl, FTAA, ACTA, and now the
TPP illustrate how the informational aspects of international trade lawmaking
have shifted since the popularization of the Internet, and how official efforts
towards greater transparency have continuously fallen short of civil society's
incrementally heightened expectations.
As Professor Peter Yu noted about the negotiation of ACTA, secret
negotiations and restrictive information policies raise the kinds of transparency
and accountability concerns that may "transform]'] issues that were too technical
to capture public consciousness into matters lay people could understand and
relate to."!" Secrecy creates the threshold perception of a democratic deficit and
invites further questions about the balance of legislative and executive power,
industry capture, and freedom of information. By looking at the practices of
both the USTR and selected international treaty-making bodies, this paper will
explore the origins of the current conflict over information access in trade
diplomacy and identify what these trends may portend for information access
regarding future agreements.
II See section V(A), infra.
12 See ide
13 See sections V(C) and V(D), infra.
14 See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV.
975, 1002 (2011).
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I. Why Keep Secrets? Discretion in Diplomacy
Managing foreign affairs is generally an executive's responsibility. The
"classic diplomatic function" hails back to the era when "sovereigns, personally
vested with full authority, commissioned ambassadors plenipotentiary to transact
their business with other states.'?" In the words of Blackstone, it is "the king's
prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and
princes.?" The diplomat was an alter ego of his monarch.l ' As such, treaty-
making has not historically been subject to populist appeals for power- and
information-sharing.
Diplomats traditionally prefer secrecy so that they may act in the assur-
ance that their nations will support, and not second-guess, their efforts. 18 Indeed,
"the central virtue of the old diplomacy" was "the ability to conduct confidential
negotiations confidentially.?" There is the adage about too many cooks spoiling
the soup: within a theory of rational decision-making, increasing the number of
private participants to treaty negotiations increases the chances that their
numbers may "impede consensual agreement, [which] might raise the cost of
making international treaties and therefore limit their scope and influence.t'i"
Secrecy is defensible from the perspective "of the trader who looks for a
better bargain through not having given away his entire hand at the beginning.'?"
A secretive approach may also "help insulate the negotiations from external
influences, which range from political complications in the capitols to opposition
from civil society groups at both the national and international levels.,,22
Confidentiality and discretion allow negotiators to speak frankly and make
compromises with one another, and hopefully maintain amicable relations from
one agreement to the next.23 Keeping the grittiest details out of the written
15 Hubert H. Humphrey, The Senate in Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July
1959) 525, 527.
16 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 257 (Lippincotted., 1859).
17 See PAUL S. REINSCH, SECRET DIPLOMACY: How FAR CAN ITBEELIMINATED? 23
(1922).
18 See WALTER LIPPMANN, THE STAKES OF DIPLOMACY 34 (1932).
19 Humphrey, supra note 15, at 527.
20 Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REv. 1573, 1600-1601
(2011). On the other hand, "[c]ultural theories about group dynamics might generate the
opposite hypothesis by positing that greater inclusion and more deliberation will build
confidence, leading to more and greater agreements." Id at 1601.
2I REINSCH, supra note 17, at 167.
22 Yu, supra note 14, at 1005.
23 See William 1. Katt, Jr., Note, The New Paper Chase: Public Access to Trade
Agreement Negotiating Documents, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 679,690-691 (2006); see also
Yu, supra note 14, at 1006 ("For example, the benefits of an amicable relationshipduring
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record also allows a party the flexibility to revise its stance from one agreement
to the next" Shielding diplomatic negotiations and treaty texts from a nation's
own legislature, press, or population also allows the executive to avoid or delay
opposition and interference and, if needed, distance itself from failure." This
benefits the ambassador "who desires to work quietly without interruptions from
an excitable public, who desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away contrasts
which publicity would tend to exaggerate.':"
Even in the earliest days of American democracy, the ideal of a fully-
informed self-governing public was tempered with acknowledgement that some
executive secrecy would always be necessary. During the Constitutional
Convention in 1789, delegates recognized a need to preserve secrecy related to
treaties and military operations." In the Federalist Papers, John Jay describes
the importance of the treaty power, "especially as it relates to war, peace, and
commerce"; to negotiate such treaties "perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch
are sometimes requisite.T" Jay argues that secrecy and expediency are inoffen-
sive to democracy in part because they are most often necessary in the case of
"those preparatory and auxiliary measures, which are not otherwise important in
a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the
negotiation.,,29
Most executive actors would likely argue that secrecy "is not directed
against the legislature or the public, but is merely designed to achieve security
the ACTA negotiations could be easily extended to cover the ongoing negotiations of the
[TPP].").
24 See Kart, supra note 23, at 692; see also notes 101-108, infra, and accompanying
text (regarding a FOIA lawsuit in which the USTR argued that it should not be forced to
disclose information that could arguably limit its ability to negotiate alternative interpre-
tations ofa particular phrase in subsequent diplomatic engagements).
25 See Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband, Secrecy in the Foreign Relations of
Three Democracies: A Comparative Analysis, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1973)
(offering a "Taxonomy of Principle Foreign Affairs Secrets). The freedom to rewrite the
rules, as it were, may have a different meaning when so many contemporary agreements
tackle continuous regulatory obligations; "Managerial forms of treaty-making, in areas
such as trade, the environment, and human rights, attempt to secure the benefits of
institutionalization on an on-going basis and not only when treaties are initially con-
cluded." Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 BOSTON COL. INT'L & COMPo L.
REv. 213,221 (2002)
26 REINSCH, supra note 17, at 167-168.
27 See Kiyul Ohm, The Founders and the Revolutionary Underpinning of the
Concept ofthe Right to Know, 85 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC'NS. Q. 393,398 (2008).
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 360 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961 ) (emphasis
in original).
29 Id.
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objectives which are to everyone's benefit.?" Proponents of a strong system of
international free trade make a similar argument.31
At the beginning of the twentieth century, documentation of diplomatic
negotiations was largely a matter of the convener's preference with some room
for happenstance.32 The cataclysm of World War I introduced some new ideas
about democracy and transparency in foreign affairs. Writing in 1922, Paul
Reinsch proclaimed that it was "indeed worth inquiring how far our secretive
methods in foreign affairs are to blame for the pitiful condition in which the
world finds itself to-day.,,33 Arguing for a greater role for Parliament in British
foreign affairs circa 1921, George Young quipped: "[W]hen we come to the
fundamental issues of peace and war, the danger of concealing the principles of
the national policy from Parliament is far greater than any danger that could be
created by a sensational Press and an emotional public out of a measure of
publicity. Secret diplomacy not only increases the danger of war, but it increases
30 Franck & Weisband, supra note 25, at 15. Indeed, Congress at one time tacitly
acknowledged limitations on its own entitlement to sensitive records in foreign affairs.
See Franck & Weisband, supra note 25, at 26 (comparing the laws governing Congres-
sional Access to the Executive Department of Foreign Affairs with that of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, circa 1789). Political opportunism was supposed to halt at the
water's edge, to allow America to "speak[] with maximum authority." Humphrey, supra
note 15, at 533 (quoting Senator Arthur Vandenberg); see also Lippmann, supra note 18,
at 16.
31 See Katt, supra note 23, at 693. For so long as the USTR plans to negotiate trade
agreements, "it is in the best interests of U.S. citizens that their government be well posi-
tioned to extract diffuse benefits in those negotiations ... secrecy for negotiating
documents serves this goal." Id
32 At the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 a private citizen, enthusiastic
peace advocate, and unofficial "delegate at large" named William T. Stead took it upon
himself to record the entire proceedings for posterity:
The Second Conference, like the First, desired to conduct its proceedings in
private, but decided to supply certain information to the public, in such form and in
such quantities as not to interfere with the orderly course of its deliberations. But the
Conference was very large, and it might well happen that delegates ...might not be
fully abreast of the proceedings.... Mr. Stead established, published, and supplied at
his own expense to the members of the Conference, a daily chronicle of its proceed-
ings.... including the official and social life, contained accounts of the meetings,
abstracts of reports, and at times the full text of important addresses ... .it is not too
much to say that [Stead's publication] gives the best daily picture of the Conference,
its hopes, its fears, its actual work, which is likely to appear.
JAMES BROWN SCOTT, 1 THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 172-
173 (1909).
33 REINSCH, supra note 17, at 5.
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the dangers of it.,,34 There must be limits, however: "Of course, no one is
proposing anything as absurd as that the actual negotiations between two
Foreign Offices should be published as they proceeded.?"
In addition to fervent nationalism, World War I revealed "a vague but
grudging recognition that trade and finance are involved in diplomacy, and there
has appeared a mass of literature interested not so much in the machinery of
peace as in dealing with the provocations to war.,,36 The war had largely dis-
mantled the existing network of bilateral cooperation, and attempts to re-
establish trade agreements during the interwar years were largely unsuccessful.
In addition to the tumult of new governments, re-drawn borders, and worldwide
economic depression, the "emergence of huge, urban working populations began
to manifest itself, not only through the widespread organization of labor, but also
in the more popularly responsive nature of governments.r'"
Calls were made for the creation of international, inter-governmental
bodies to anticipate and manage crises, as such bodies "are needed wherever the
prizes are great, the territory unorganized, and the competition active.,,38 In
addition to international oversight, increasing public participation in international
affairs would, hopefully, be good for peace and for trade. As Walter Lippmann
forecast, "bring[ing] diplomacy under the scrutiny of business men" and
broadening its base through foreign trade and investment would realign foreign
policy." "Agreements and disagreements will cross frontiers. Men will discover
that they are more in sympathy with a group in some foreign country than with
some of their own fellow-citizens ....The real effect of democracy on foreign
affairs will be to make them no longer foreign.?"
This process took time. During the negotiation of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, which established uneasy peace in Europe in 1919, access to information
was limited on the grounds that it would "inflame public opinion and render
impossible a compromise."?' "The bald statements given to the press concerning
the negotiations did not satisfy anyone. Most of what was going on became
known to outsiders. But its authenticity was so uncertain and it was so
commingled with mere rumor that the public soon gave up in despair.?"
34 GEORGE YOUNG, DIPLOMACY OLD AND NEW 58-59 (1921).
35Id at 61.
36 LIPPMANN, supra note 18, at 7 (Introduction, 1915).
37 Id at 67. This is possibly the first time that social opposition to international trade
policy emerged asa policy issue.
38Id at 135.
39 Id. at 194; see also id at 196-198.
4° Id at 195.
41 REINSCH, supra note 17 at 7.
42 Id. at 7-8.
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Some nations also resisted the publication of treaty documents.
Although the covenant that established the League of Nations contained a
provision for the registration and publication of all international agreements
entered into by League Members.f some of the "strongest contracting powers"
in the League did not comply." The movement towards publishing treaties had
taken root, however, and when the United Nations Charter was signed in 1946 it
included a provision requiring UN members to register every treaty and inter-
national agreement to which they would thereafter enter into for publication."
While publishing concluded treaties eventually became less remarkable,
there was little impetus at the time to reveal anything more about the interna-
tional lawmaking process. The simmering anxiety of the Cold War "provided
substantial justification for limiting citizens' access to international negotiations
and deliberations; these were areas firmly within the secretive realm of national
security interests and were not for public consumption.?"
From 1948 to 1994, the majority of international trade was conducted
under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT.47 The
GATT stated that "Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in
force between the government or a governmental agency of any contracting
party and the government or governmental agency of any other contracting party
shall ... be published.?" This provision, however, "shall not require any con-
tracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice
43 League of Nations Covenant art. 18 ("Every treaty or international engagement
entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the
Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or interna-
tional engagement shall be binding until so registered.").
44 REINSCH, supra note 17, at 7. Interestingly, "[slome outsiders, indeed, such as
Russia, have quite willingly published their treaties and furnished them to the bureau of
the league." Id
45 U.N. Charter art. 102, para. 1. Since that time, the UNITED NATIONS TREATY
SERIES has compiled over 200,000 treaties in over 2,600 volumes. The UN Charter also
provides for consultations with non-governmental organizations regarding matters within
their competence. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and
International Governance, 18 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 183, 250 (1997). At the invitation of
President Roosevelt, 42 NGOs sent representatives as part of the U.S. delegation to the
U.N. Conference on International Organization, where they contributed to the drafting of
the Charter. Id at 250-251.
46 Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-making, 27
CORNELL INT'LLJ. 699, 708 (1994).
47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 (hereinafter GATT); see also generally Housman, supra note 46, at 703-715.
48 GAIT, supra note 47, at Art. X, para. 1.
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the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.,,49
Bilateral trade agreements during this period were typically rules-based arrange-
ments for mutual trade liberalization, and would often "include tariffs, quotas,
financial data, number of shipments, or other sensitive information" which was
kept confidential." The GATT did not provide for transparency or public
participation in decision-making, in part because it was not originally conceived
as an institution." and in part because there was little perceived need for non-
state actors to participate; "even industries, the principal actors in international
trade, were not perceived as needing a major independent voice in international
trade decision-making. ,,52
Although the GATT itself was not specific about confidentiality or
information policy, official GATT meetings were conducted in secret.53 The
majority of documents created under its auspices were classified and publicly
unavailable; "[w]hen the GATT does declassify a document, it does so at a
glacial pace rendering most of these declassified documents outdated and of little
value to anyone but GATT history scholars.T"
While disclosure and publication of treaties generally increased as such
agreements themselves multiplied, the arguments for discretion and judicious
secrecy remained fundamentally the same: exposing negotiating aims and
strategy would sacrifice critical advantages and undermine prosperity and
security. For some policy-makers, nothing that has happened in the intervening
years has altered this fundamental truth. In the words of Brian A. Pomper,
former chief international trade counsel to Senator Max Baucus, referring to the
TPP talks, "We can't give our trade partners a road map into how we plan to get
what we want out of negotiations. That just makes no sense. We don't do that
with any other kind of negotiations. It is beyond me why some people think we
should do it here.,,55
49 Id. Note that the GATT was not originally intended to operate institutionally and
thus its lack of provisions for transparency or cooperation with NGOs may be partially
attributable to the circumstances surrounding the failure of negotiations to create an
International Trade Organization to implement the GAIT itself See Housman, supra
note 46, at 704-705.
50 See Yu, supra note 14, at 1007; see also id. at 1007 n. 198.
51 See Housman, supra note 46, at 705 (discussing the failure of the talks to create an
International Trade Organization and the impact of this failure on transparency within
GATT).
52 Id at 707.
53 Housman, supra note 46, at 710.
54 Id
55 Lewis, supra note 6.
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II. Private Participation and Information Sharing in International
Lawmaking
While the classical diplomatic model has many justifications for its
secrecy, there are historical examples of information sharing and extra-govern-
mental consultations in international governance.
The United States began publishing an annual collection of State
Department correspondence and other documents in 1861, originally called
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States." From those
volumes, attorney and law professor Francis Wharton distilled many of the
principles of the United States' diplomacy into his influential Digest of
International Law, first published in 1886.57 These publications were viewed by
some as examples for other nations, and any risk they might have posed to future
diplomatic action was tolerable: "The fact that a precedent reported in
[Wharton's] digest, might be cited against the American Government as an
admission, does not imply a disadvantage which would at all offset the benefits
resulting in general from public knowledge.T"
Private groups have served many roles in the development of interna-
tional law and policy, especially the "gathering, analysis, and dissemination of
information relevant to decisionmaking.T" Non-governmental parties interested
in international lawmaking have historically included both commercial and
issue-driven organizations, as is still the case today. Some of the earliest
"NGOs," such as the British group the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the
Slave Trade, founded in 1787, sought to impart a social and moral conscious to
international economic relations."
56 This continuous publication has undergone several name changes and is now
called simply FOREIGN RELATIONS. An earlier work, DIGEST OF THE PUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE ArrORNEYS-GENERAL, AND OF THE LEADING DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS, WITH REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, TREATIES AND KINDRED
SUBJECTS, was edited by Assistant Secretary of State John L. Cadwalader in 1877; it was
a single-volumeof less than 300 pages.
57 FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1886). The DIGEST was revised and expanded by Professor John Bassett Moore
in 1906. A subsequent DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, prepared by Green Haywood
Hackworth, was published beginning in 1940; this DIGEST did not reprint material from
the earlier versions. The most recent iteration of this work, prepared by Marjorie M.
Whiteman, was first published in 1963 and does not revisit material from Hackworth or
the earlier publications.
58 REINSCH, supra note 17, at 196.
59 Chamovitz, supra note 45, at 271.
60ld at 192.
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Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century free trade became a focus of
private mobilization." Technical experts have joined international negotiating
tables since at least the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in conferences
relating to the sciences." Early international efforts to establish protections for
"industrial property" brought government delegates together with interested
private individuals." At the first International Congress of Chambers of Com-
merce in 1905, participants included government officials and businesspeople."
Throughout this time, however, the work of NGOs was primarily directed
towards "pre-normative processes, i.e. agenda setting.Y"
Private parties have over time increased their participation, and thereby
their influence, over international lawmaking. 66 This can be attributed to several
factors, including the pace of scientific and technological change. Such dyna-
mism "has required state law-making institutions to resign a substantial amount
of competence to the informal law-making of the economic sectors concerned,
because national legislatures have simply been unable to keep Up.,,67
In hearings on what would become the Trade Act of 1974, Special
Trade Representative William D. Eberle spoke of the need to solicit input from
business and civil society groups in the formulation of trade policy, but also of
the challenges that such openness could pose:
The industrial, agricultural, labor, and public interests generally must
also be weighed in a more direct manner. There has been repeated
criticism that past efforts to use advice from these elements of our
economy have been inadequate. We agree, they have been inadequate.
On the other hand, the sheer enormity of the task of hearing and
weighing advice from every quarter of American life must be
recognized. We will need great ingenuity both in the Government and in
61 Id at 194.
62 Id at 198.
63Id at 201.
64 Id at 208-209. See also H. Rep. No. 62-438 (1912) (regarding the Fifth Interna-
tional Congress ofChambers ofCommerce).
65 Stephan Hobe, The Role of Non-State Actors, in Particular of NGOs, in Non-
Contractual Law-Making and the Development of Customary International Law, in
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 324 (R. Wolfrum & V.
Roben eds. 2005).
66 Stephan, supra note 20, at 1599.
67 W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization ofContemporary International Law-
Making Processes and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 22 (R. Wolfrum & V. Roben eds. 2005).
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0731126500012051
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Pennsylvania Libraries, on 13 Sep 2021 at 16:43:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
252 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 42.2
the private sector to develop a better apparatus for distilling the essence
ofadvice from so many people."
As discussed below, the framework that was ultimately established by
the Trade Act has successfully linked American diplomats to expertise from
many sectors of the economy. More generally, however, the close relationship
between trade officials and industry representatives has created information
disparities between them and other civil society groups, which in tum has
aggravated perceptions of corporate capture in trade policy." When it comes
time to negotiate trade agreements, these perceptions contribute to a vicious
cycle of secrecy and protest.
III. International Organizations and Transparency
The move to establish intergovernmental organizations for the regula-
tion of global affairs was itself a move towards transparency. Rather than
isolated conversations between two states or ad hoc conferences." "the practice
of meeting together in larger groups is itself inimical to the strict maintenance of
the older methods [of secretive diplomacy] and we may expect a natural growth
of more simple and direct dealings.";"
The introduction of international organizations, like the UN, into inter-
national lawmaking has been transformative." For example, the use of interna-
tional organizations as negotiation venues and depositories for concluded agree-
ments has empowered smaller and less powerful states and increased the
diversity of participants in treaty-making." Most importantly for purposes of
this discussion, "[s]tructural aspects of [international organizations], including
provisions for access to documents and for observer and other forms of non-
voting status, have, in addition, provided entry points for NGOs growing partici-
pation in various forms of interstate diplomacy, including treaty-making.'?"
Secrecy in multilateral trade negotiations has been a repeated source of
criticism, however, even when held within an institutional forum. In a 2010
study of international institutions involved in intellectual property issues,
68 The Trade Reform Act of1973: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 93rd
Congo 216 (Mar. 5, 1974) (testimony of Ambassador William D. Eberle, Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations).
69 See generally Section VI, infra.
70 See Alvarez, supra note 25, at 218 (describing the use of ad hoc conferences as the
"fundamental mechanism" for multilateral treaty-making in the 19th century).
71 REINSCH, supra note 17, at 15-16.
72 See Alvarez, supra note 25, at 227 ("The very existence of [international organiza-
tions] conditions the traditional use of state power.").
73 See id. at 223.
74Id
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including the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
and the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD),
Jeremy Malcolm observed that "in general, an inverse relationship exists
between the openness to participation in an organization, and the degree of
'legalization' or 'hardness' of its OUtpUt.,,75 Institutions such as the WTO and
WIPO that routinely administer and oversee the creation of binding agreements
are less transparent than organizations that are better known for creating only
"soft law" or policy recommendations. 76
The World Trade Organization was established in 1994 and was
originally intended to strengthen and enhance the multilateral trade regime by
finally situating GATT within a permanent institution." Unfortunately, the
WTO inherited the GATT's poor reputation for transparency to non-state actors,
and was promptly denounced by some outside groups which argued that it
lacked accountability and is solely a front for moneyed interests.78
Writing in 1994, just months before the World Trade Organization was
formally recognized, environmental attorney Patti Goldman stated the
complaint:
International trade agreements are carried out in secret without any
mechanisms for informing the public about the matters being negotiated,
for obtaining public input, or for ensuring that the decision-makers are
neutral and have a complete record on which to make decisions. The
negotiators are trade officials who rarely have expertise or experience in
other social policies that are affected by the end product of the negotia-
tions. Although the negotiators claim that negotiations and foreign rela-
tions would be impaired if the public were made privy to information
about proposals on the table, draft agreements are routinely made
available to hundreds of industry advisors, and are sometimes leaked
75 Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in GlobalIP Policy Institutions,
PIlIP Research Paper No.6, American University College of Law (Sept. 2010) at 18,
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.eduJresearch/6/ (last visited Jul. 24,
2014). Malcolm is a senior policy analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
currently a Steering Committee member of the OECD's Civil Society Information
Society Advisory Council.
76 Id But see Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA.J. INT'L
L. 369, 381 (1997) (describing her analysis of the defeat of certain U.S. proposals at
WIPO through analysis of draft treaties and alternative language proposals offered during
the conference, suggesting broad and timely access to relevant documents).
77 ANDREW G. BROWN, RELUCTANT PARTNERS: A HISTORY OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE COOPERATION 152 (2003).
78 Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future ofthe World
Trade Organization, 2 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 403,403 (2001).
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when it suits the purposes of the negotiators. Aside from sporadic leaks,
the public is kept in the dark until the terms of the agreement have been
cast in stone."
IV. Trade and Transparency in the United States
A. Treaties and Executive Agreements
Why is access to information and public notice of international law-
making an issue in the first place? In the U.S., the answer is connected to the
division of power between the executive and the legislature, as discussed below
in Section D, and the growing overlap between the domains of domestic and
international law.80
International agreements may have a significant impact on domestic
law." For example, the United States' implementation of the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works granted copyright protection to
preexisting works from Berne member countries.Y Prior to passage of the
79 Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade
Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'LLJ. 631, 646-644 (1994).
80 A treaty, by any other name, is an "international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law." Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 2(1)(a). In the United States, the
Constitution vests treaty-making authority with the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. U.S. CONST., art. II, §2. By some estimates, however, only approximately
five percent of international agreements to which the U.S. is a party have been subject to
this formal approval process. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
208 (2006). These non-treaty agreements are referred to as "executive agreements" or
"congressional-executive agreements" and are sanctioned by other legal mechanisms. See
ide at 208-210; see also Dona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future
of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE LJ. 1236, 1239 (2008). Such
agreements have become more common over time, in part because they may elude
certain kinds of political gridlock in Congress. See id. at 1287, 1312-1316. They can be
frustrating, from a researcher's perspective, because there is "no single comprehensive
database available that delineates solo executive agreements, congressional-executive
agreements, and Article II treaties." Id at 1253.
These distinctions are irrelevant to the nations on the other side of the table, who
consider all concluded agreements to be on equal footing. See Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, S. Rpt. 106-71 (Jan. 2001), at 4.
8\ This includes U.S. regulatory law. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, International
Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REv.
435 (2002).
82 See Golan V. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 874 (2012). The Berne Convention took
effect in 1886, but the United States did not become a party to the treaty until 1989, and
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implementing legislation, many "foreign works 'restored' to protection by the
measure had entered the public domain in this country.,,83 A group of musicians,
publishers, and other creative-types challenged the constitutionality of the
implementing legislation, which effectively clawed-back many works that had
previously been available for royalty-free use. The Supreme Court, however,
upheld the law and Congress' prerogative to further the United States' interest in
"ensuring exemplary compliance with our international obligations.T" The
treaty broadened the scope of U.S. copyright. As discussed below, such an
upward ratchet of IP protection in the form of an international fait accompli was
one of the most significant points ofpublic opposition to ACTA.85
Over the past three decades, trade agreements have increasingly sought
to create transnational regulatory regimes that, in tum, may impact domestic law,
especially in the areas of intellectual property, labor, and environmental protec-
tion." In the U.S., federal statutes governing these topics are proposed, debated,
and voted on in public. The legislative process provides ample opportunity for
lobbyists, journalists, lawyers, and laypeople to provide feedback and keep tabs
on bill status and member voting records. The high level of transparency that
Americans are accustomed to in domestic lawmaking has influenced expecta-
tions for international lawmaking with domestic ramifications. Yet the U.S. is
one of only "a small handful of countries that combine two features in their
Constitution-an international lawmaking process that provides for less involve-
ment by part of the legislature in international treaty making than in domestic
lawmaking and the automatic incorporation of the results of that process into
domestic law.,,87 Moreover, the domestic ramifications of such agreements may
only be clear after they have come into force.
B. Trade Negotiations and National Security
Although several federal agencies have jurisdiction over some aspect of
u.S. trade, the Office of the United States Trade Representative has primary
responsibility for developing the United States' international trade policy and
did not actually implement the relevant provision of the Berne Convention until 1994,
pursuant to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). Id.; see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465,108 Stat. 4809
(Dec. 8, 1994).
83 Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. at 874.
84/d at 894.
85 See Section V(D), infra; see also Yu, supra note 14, at 1019-1021.
86 See Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT'LL. & FOREIGN AFF. 209,221-222 (2011).
87 Hathaway, supra note 80, at 1272.
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advising and speaking for the President on international trade issues, among
other duties/"
Today, the USTR's stated policy is to make publicly available "as much
information concerning its activities as is possible, consistent with its responsi-
bility to protect national security.t'" "National security," however, means much
more than preventing terrorist attacks and securing America's resources and
borders. Under the current Executive Order governing the classification of
government information, material may be classified if "its unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable
damage to the national security" and it pertains to, among other things, "foreign
government information.,,90
88 19 U.S.C. 2171(c); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THEWORLD TRADING SYSTEM 98
(2d ed. 1997). The role of today's USTR dates back just over fifty years. In January 1963,
President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 11075 creating the Special Represen-
tative for Trade Negotiations within the Executive Office of the President. Exec. Order
11,075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473, Sec. 2(a) (Jan. 18, 1963); subsequently amended by Exec.
Order 11,106,28 Fed. Reg. 3,911, Sec. 3 (Apr. 20,1963); Exec. Order 11,113,28 Fed.
Reg. 6,183 (June 13, 1963). This order provided for the administration of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-794,76 Stat. 872 (1962). The Special Representative
was tasked with advising and assisting the President in all matters related to the negotia-
tion or administration of trade agreements, other than treaties. Exec. Order 11,106, 28 FR
3,911, §§ 2, 4 (Apr. 20, 1963). Originally called the office of the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations, it received a new title under the Trade Act of 1974, which also
provided a legislative charter and made the Office accountable to Congress, as well as the
President. Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, § 141(b)(3)(B) (directing the Special Represen-
tative to "report directly to the President and the Congress, and be responsible to the
President and the Congress for the administration of trade agreements programs under
this Act, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and section 350 of the TariffAct of 1930) and
141(b)(3)(C) (requiring the Special Representative to "be responsible for making reports
to Congress" with respect to its duties). In an accompanying report, the Senate finance
committee stated that "[i]t is essential that the Congress, which as the constitutional
authority to lay and collect duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations, provide
a mandate for the Executive to enter into [international trade] negotiations. It is also
essential, however, that the Congress and the various segments of our economy which are
likely to be importantly affected by trade negotiations, be fully involved in the
negotiating process." S. Rept. 93-1298 at 69 (1974).
89 15 C.F .R. § 2008.4 (2013). Consistent with the general guidelines for the classifi-
cation of government documents, USTR information that has been classified since
December 1, 1978 is subject to automatic declassification after six years. 15 C.F .R.
§ 2008.6 (a) (2013).
90 Exec. Order 13,526, Sec. 1.4(b), 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010). "Foreign government
information" is a very broad category, encompassing:
(1) Information provided to the United States Government by a foreign
government or governments, an international organization of governments, or
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Under this classification structure, the USTR enjoys broad discretion to
treat as confidential not only the information it receives from foreign
governments during trade negotiations, but also its own information and
documentation, as long as the information is produced within the context of
confidential international negotiations. The USTR has not, as a matter of
practice, made the text of its agreements publicly available until they are
completed." The confidentiality agreement between among the parties to the
TPP is consistent with this policy."
Information-seekers outside of government (and who do not have
privileged access as USTR advisors, discussed below), must rely on the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) for access to unpublished information about trade
negotiations." FOIA grants any person the right to obtain access to federal
agency records, and has been a useful tool for improving the transparency of the
federal government. 94 FOIA is limited, however, by several exceptions. These
exceptions were designed to "reach a workable balance between the right of the
public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in
confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.?"
First among the exceptions to FOIA's general mandate of disclosure is an
exemption for material classified as secret in the interests of national security.96
any element thereof, with the expectation that the information, the source of the
information, or both, are to be held in confidence;
(2) Information produced by the United States Government pursuant to or
as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or
an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring
that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence; or
(3) Information received and treated as 'foreign government information'
under the terms of a predecessor order.
Id at § 6.1(s).
91 See Goldman, supra note 79, at 667.
92 See notes 256-257, infra, and accompanying text.
93 See 5 U.S.C. §552 (2012); see also Marsha West, Classified Information Policy,
Government Transparency, and Wikil.eaks, DTIP: DOCUMENTS TO THE PEOPLE, Summer
2013, at 13.
94 See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal
Landscape ofFederal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1787,1797 (2008).
95 H. Rept. 89-1497 (1966) at 27 ("Clarifying and Protecting the Right of the Public
to Information").
96 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1) (2013) (exempting material "(A) specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order."). FOIA also exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and privileged and confidential" and "inter-agency or
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USTR regulations provide for the agency to "generally withhold[]
predecisional, deliberative documents and classified trade negotiating and policy
documents" pursuant to one or more FOIA exceptions." The USTR has taken
the position that disclosure of negotiating documentation, including information
about its own policy positions, must be kept secret in order to preserve "the
negotiating flexibility of both the United States and our negotiating partners
when considering...trade and investment treaties.?"
USTR has occasionally been sued in response to its decision to withhold
documents under one or more FOIA exceptions, including the national security
exception." Courts generally give deferential treatment to the executive's
designation of national security information, 100 The USTR's conservative
approach was recently vindicated by the federal court of appeals for the D.C.
Circuit,':" which reversed a lower court oecision that directed USTR to tum over
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4), (5) (2013).
97 15 C.F.R. § 2001.4 (2013). It is unsurprising, then, that a report prepared by the
USTR's Chief FOIA Officer found that "[t]he majority of FOIA requests [to the USTR]
require special handling." Office of the United States Trade Representative, FOIA Plan
Under Executive Order 13,392 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defaultJ
files/Office-of-the-US-Trade-Representative-FOIA-Plan.pdf. Executive Order 13,392
required federal agencies to conduct internal audits to assess their FOIA compliance and
promote a "citizen-centered and results-oriented approach." Exec. Order No. 13,392,
Section I(d), 3 C.F.R. 216 (2006).
98 Final Brief for the Appellants, Nov. 27, 2012, Center for International Environ-
mental Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 12-5136 (D.C. Cir.), at
26.
99 For example, see Brayton v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 657
F.Supp.2d 138 (D.D.C. 2009). In 2008, the non-profit public interest advocacy organiza-
tions Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge sued USTR seeking records
related to ACTA, then under negotiation. Complaint, Electronic Frontier Foundation v.
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1:08-CY-1599-RMC, Sep. 17, 2008.
The plaintiffs ultimately dropped the suit after it became clear that ACTA would likely be
concluded (and its terms become public) before the resolution of the litigation. Press
Release, EFF and Public Knowledge Reluctantly Drop Lawsuit for Information About
ACTA (June 17,2009), available at https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/06/17 (last
visited Jul. 24,2014).
100 See, e.g., Center for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927
(D.C.C., 2003). Under this structure, then, it is not surprising that FOIA requests for
information withheld under the NSI exception are less likely to succeed than requests that
confront other FOIA exceptions. See Katt, supra note 23, at 694.
101 Center for International Environmental Law v. Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 718 F.3d 899 (D.C.C. 2013).
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a contested document under FOIA. 102 In that case, the non-profit Center for
International Environmental Law (CIEL) sought a one-page position paper
created by the USTR during negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas.l'" This document included the United States' initial proposed position
on the meaning of the phrase "in like circumstances," which was relevant to how
nations would treat foreign investors relative to local or other foreign inves-
tors. 104 The USTR classified this document and refused to disclose it pursuant to
a FOIA request. 105 The USTR argued that forced disclosure would cause foreign
nations to lose trust in the United States and hamper the USTR's ability to
negotiate an alternative interpretation ofa particular phrase in another setting. I06
CIEL countered that the risk that foreign governments would lose trust
in the United States if USTR was forced to disclose its own negotiating docu-
ment was unsubstantiated, and further argued that USTR failed to demonstrate
that reduced flexibility in future negotiations would harm national security.l'"
The district court agreed that USTR had failed to assert a plausible explanation
for why disclosure of the document could be expected to harm foreign
relations. 108
On appeal, however, the court focused on the agency's argument that
disclosure would restrict its flexibility in negotiating future agreements.
"Whether-or to what extent-this reduced flexibility might affect the ability of
the United States to negotiate future trade agreements is not for us to speculate,"
the court wrote.l'" "The question is not whether the court agrees in full with the
Trade Representative's evaluation of the expected harm to foreign relations ....
Rather, the question is 'whether on the whole record the [a]gency's judgment
objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and
plausibility. ,,,110 The USTR's power to keep its secrets was vindicated.
102 Center for International Environmental Law v. Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 845 F.Supp.2d 252 (D.D.C. 2012).
103Id. at 253-254.
104Id ("[I.]e., when 'national' treatment or 'most-favored-nation' treatment applies."
Id
105 The document was classified pursuant to then-governing Executive Order
12,958 § 1.2(a)(4), which was subsequently revoked by Executive Order 13,526.
106 Center for International Environmental Law, 845 F.Supp.2d at 255.
107Id.
108 Id at 260.
109 Center for International Environmental Law v. Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 718 F.3d 899, 903 (2013).
110 Id (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
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c. Private Advisors and Trade Policy
One way that the federal government has sought to improve its policy-
making is to seek expert advice outside of its own bureaucracy. The 1972
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) provides for the creation and
oversight of the various committees, councils, and other groups that may advise
executive branch officers and agencies. III Under FACA, advisory committees
should only be established when their contribution is found to be "essential,"I 12
should convene for limited durations.i':' and are subject to Congressional
oversight. 114 FACA also provides that all advisory committee meetings must be
open to the public, and the records of each committee must be available for
public inspection. I 15
The Trade Act of 1974 further established that the executive branch
must seek information and advice from "elements of the private sector"
regarding trade negotiating objectives and bargaining positions, the operationali-
zation of trade agreements after their conclusion, and other matters of U.S. trade
policy.!" This advice is procured through the Advisory Committee for Trade
Policy and Negotiations, the membership ofwhich is recommended by USTR. 117
There are also currently sixteen Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs)
"created to reflect the manufacturing and service sectors of the U.s. economy, as
well as issue-oriented matters that cut across all sectors."!" The mechanisms
established by the Trade Act were designed to require "by far the most extensive
consultations with the private sector ever undertaken in preparation for trade
negotiations." I 19
The work of USTR's advisory committees, however, is itself often not
open to public scrutiny. The Trade Act of 1974 also provided that while FACA
111 FederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct, 5 U.S.C. [Appendix] § 2(a), (b) (2012).
112 5 U.S.C. [Appendix] § 2(b)(2).
113 5 U.S.C. [Appendix] § 2(b)(3)(2012).
114 5 U.S.C. [Appendix] § 5 (2012).
115 5 U.S.C. [Appendix] § 10(a),(b) (2012).
116 19 U.S.C. §2155(a)(I)(A)-(C)(2012).
117 19 U.S.C. §2155(b)(I) (2012). The current membership of the committee is
published on the USTR's website, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmental-
affairs/advisory-committees/advisory-committee-trade-policy-and-negotiati (last visited
JuI. 24, 2014) and includes representatives from Congress, private companies, organized
labor, think tanks, and non-profitissue-oriented organizations.
118 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY
COMMIITEES (ITAC), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees/industry-trade-
advisory-committees-itac (last visitedJut 24, 2014).
119 The Trade Reform Act of1973: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 93rd
Congo 293 (Mar. 5, 1974)(preparedstatementof AmbassadorWilliam D. Eberle, Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations) (hereinafter Eberle statement).
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0731126500012051
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Pennsylvania Libraries, on 13 Sep 2021 at 16:43:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
2014] GENEVIEVE TUNG 261
applies to both the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations and
all other trade advisory committees established for specific industries, these
committees are exempt from FACA's requirements related to open meetings,
public notice, public participation, and public availability of documents, when-
ever the executive branch determines that the meetings ''will be concerned with
matters the disclosure of which would seriously compromise the development by
the United States Government of trade policy, priorities, negotiating objectives,
or bargaining positions."120
Moreover, public access to an agency's meeting with its advisory
committee(s), or information about such a meeting, can be limited or eliminated
when the agency properly determines that public disclosure is likely to touch on
matters "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
Order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign policy and
(B) in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.,,121 These
exemptions were added "to ensure an effective two-way liaison between the
private sector and government which cannot take place if negotiating objectives,
tactics and strategy, as well as business confidential information is available to
the public in open meetings including the press and representatives of foreign
governments.v'<
The USTR may share otherwise secret materials regarding trade
agreements and negotiations with its private advisors without triggering any
obligation to disclose this material under FOIA.123 Case law tells us that
members of agency advisory committees are not considered members of the
public, and therefore an agency's decision to share its information with these
committees does not vitiate application of at least, FOIA's fifth exemption,
which limits release of intra-agency material that would not be publicly available
short of discovery in litigation.!" To do so, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reasoned, would frustrate the law's intent "to encourage a free and candid
exchange of ideas during the process of decision-making and to prevent
120 19 U.S.C. §2155(f)(1), (2) (2012).
121 5 U.S.C. §552b(c)(I) (2012).
122 Eberle statement, supra note 119, at 292.
123 See David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the
Creation ofInternational Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 105,
116 (2012) ("Today ... the public does not get useful information from government
whereas private companies do. Thus, private corporate interests largely control the flow
ofinfonnation to USTR.").
124 In Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101, 108 (D.C.C.
1976), the D.C. Circuit declined to hold that "the mere disclosure of an intra-agency
memorandum to an advisory committee makes the memorandum public information to
which exemption five is inapplicable."
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predecisional disclosure of incipient policy or decisions that could disrupt
agency procedures.v"
In practice, this arrangement allows USTR to provide "key briefings"
and disclose working drafts of agreement text to its private advisors.V" As the
experience of ACTA and the TPP has demonstrated, such selective disclosure
opens the door for conflict between stakeholders and challenges to the funda-
mental fairness ofany ensuing agreement. 127
D. The Role of Congress
While the President and his or her delegates enjoy the power to negoti-
ate treaties, Congress has ultimate Constitutional authority over the regulation of
commerce with foreign nations.':" This relationship exemplifies the contradic-
tions inherent within a government that seeks a democratic distribution of power
but also wants effective and efficient leadership in exigent situations.l'" It also
gives rise to one of the arguments for why trade negotiations must be conducted
in private: the fear that forcing diplomats to negotiate in public would make
them more likely to espouse and promote only uncontroversial, popular, or
otherwise 'safe' positions and avoid creative approaches.l "
Congress has repeatedly delegated its authority in this arena in times of
financial need. During the Great Depression Congress passed the Trade Act of
1934 which conferred wide powers on the President to enter into foreign trade
agreements with the goal of expanding international markets for U.S. goods.l"
In exchange, the law mandated that "Before any foreign trade agreement is
concluded with any foreign government ... reasonable public notice of the
intention to negotiate an agreement ... shall be given in order that any interested
person may have an opportunity to present his views to the President" or his
agents.i" Furthermore, the executive branch was required to consult with the
Tariff Commission and with, at least, the departments of State, Agriculture, and
125 Id. at 107-108.
126 See Yu, supra note 14, at 1012 (describing application of this practice in the
development ofACTA); Goldman, supra note 79, at 672-674.
127 E.g., Yu, supra note 14, at 1012-1013.
128 U.S.CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
129 "The executive champions functional utility. The demos argues for the
supremacy of the democratic process." Franck & Weisbrand, supra note 25, at 4.
130 See, e.g., Katt, supra note 24, at 691 (citing examples). Secret negotiations, of
course, can just as easily shield diplomats making unoriginal or poor decisions, or acting
at the behest of self-interested advisors.
131 Pub. L. 73-316,48 Stat. 943 (1934).
132 Id at § 4.
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Commerce, before finalizing any agreement.l " What the law lacked, however,
was any mechanism to convey the substance of a potential agreement to the
public, making meaningful input unlikely. 134
With each extension of the 1934 Act, however Congress added guide-
lines and other restrictions on Presidential autonomy in trade negotiations.l "
This shifting division of power risked creating uncertainty among negotiators
(will Congress sign off on the President's deal?) and delay (if Congress does
sign off, how long will it take to ratify the agreementj'r'i" To address these
issues, the so-called Fast Track process was introduced as part of the Trade Act
of 1974, which dramatically changed the American approach to concluding trade
deals.l " The law granted the President new authority to negotiate agreements
affecting nontariff barriers, such as subsidies, quality standards, labeling and
health and safety regulations.l " Congress would set guidelines and negotiating
objectives for the Executive branch, which in tum would be required to consult
with Congressional committees and private advisors. 139 In exchange, the
Executive branch would be assured of a simple yes-or-no vote on any resulting
legislation, to which no amendments or other changes would be permitted. 140
Fast Track was renewed multiple times!" and the process was used to
negotiate and implement the Tokyo round of the GAIT, the Canada-US Free
Trade Agreement, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).142
The 1991 renewal legislation was hotly contested, however, functioning as "an
early referendum" on the development of NAFTA, then in progress.l'" Fast
Track expired in 1994, when it was excluded from the implementing legislation
133 Id.
134 See also Brian J. Schoenborn, Note, Public Participation in Trade Negotiations:
Open Agreements, Openly ArrivedAt? 4 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE 103, 108-109(1995).
135 See Laura L. Wright, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for the Twenty-
First Century?, 12 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS 1. 979, 984 (2004).
136 See 1 CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL D. WATKINS,
CASE STUDIES IN U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATION 193 (2006).
137 See Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), § 151 et seq.; see also Wright, supra
note 135, at 984.
138 See Wright, supra note 135, at 984 n. 47.
139 See 88 Stat. 1978 at §135.
140 See id at § 151(d).
141 The law was renewed in 1979,1984, 1988, and 1991.See Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, P.L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144; Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, P.L. 98-573, 98 Stat.
2948; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107;
see also DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 195-197 (regarding
"renewal" of Fast Track in 1991).
142 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 194.
143 See id. at 195.
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for the Uruguay round of the GATT, passed the same year.!" An effort the
following year faced bipartisan opposition and also failed.!" Despite repeated
attempts, the Clinton administration was unable to renew Fast Track, which
hampered its ability to negotiate new trade deals.!" It was not until 2002 that
Congress restored a Fast-Track-style arrangement, rebranded as Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA).147
Fast Track was, at least from the early-1990s, a source of concern to
open-government advocates. 148 Such objections generally rested on Fast Track's
self-imposed limits on Congressional procedure (such as formally eliminating
committee deliberations, amendments, and filibuster), and the potential lack of
accountability for specific provisions engendered by the up-or-down voting
requirement.l'" In a 1992 analysis of Fast Track and its opponents, Professor
Harold Koh noted that this "democracy objection," unlike complaints about the
substance of trade agreements themselves, "go to the very nature of the Fast
Track procedure itself. Hence, it can and almost certainly will be heard again.,,150
TPA was not renewed in 2007.151 Its absence is sorely felt among
proponents of new trade agreements like the TPP, who fear that without clear
144 See id. at 201-202.
145 See ide at 203-204.
146 E.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, The FTAA Negotiations: A Melodrama in Five Acts, 1
Loy. INT'L L. REv. 121, 127 (2004) (describing how, in the absence of Fast Track
authority, the United States' ability to negotiate the FTAA was "completely
hamstrung.").
147 See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813
(2012). In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush
administrationargued that the U.S. should "counter terror with trade," and that delegating
negotiating authority to the executive branch would enable USTR to "build a coalition of
countries that cherish liberty in. all its aspects." Robert Zoellick, Op-Ed, Countering
Terror with Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,2001, at A35.
148 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOKLYN 1. INT'L L. 143, 161 (1992). Twenty years later Professor Koh, while on leave
from Yale Law School to serve as Legal Adviser to the State Department, was the one to
advise Senator Ronald Wyden that the Executive branch had determined that it was
authorized to conclude and accept ACTA pursuant to the 2008 PROTECT-IP Act. Letter
from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, to Sen. Ron Wyden (Mar. 6,
2012), available at http://infojustice.orglwp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-
Department-Response-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf(last visited Jul. 24, 2014).
149 See Koh, supra note 148, at 163-169.
150Id. at 162.
151 The expiration ofTPA before the conclusion of ACTA is likely the reason that
the USTR initially insisted that ACTA was negotiated as a sole executive agreement
(without need for implementing legislation) and eventually pinned its authority on the
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lines of authority and the promise of expeditious treatment in Congress, new
trade deals will wither on the vine. IS2 New TPA bills are currently pending in the
House and Senate.1S3 Notably, the "Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities
Act of2014" calls for USTR, in consultation with the leaders of the House Ways
and Means committee and the Senate Finance committee, to develop written
guidelines for public access to information regarding trade negotiations conduc-
ted under the law's auspices.f"
v. Information Access and International Trade Case Studies
The following section will describe how disputes over transparency,
including in the negotiation of four different trade agreements from the mid-
nineties to the present, have contributed to the current conflict over access to
information in the creation of trade law.
A. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment is the first example of how a
real or perceived lack of transparency can create political liability in the informa-
tion age. In recent decades, some trade agreements have sought compromise on
rules governing international investment, as investment is often complementary
to trade. ISS The North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, specified
rules to liberalize investment between its member countries, as well as a private
enforcement mechanism for those rules.l" Since the 1980s, hundreds of bilateral
2008 PROTECT-IP Act (Pub. L. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4266 (2008), codified at 15 U.S.C.
8113(a) (2012)).
152 See, e.g., The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 113th Congo 4 (Apr. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on Finance), 14 (colloquy between Sen. Hatch and
witness Hon. Karan Bhatia); The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Challenges and
Potential: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Congo 5 (May 17, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Edward Royce, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs); 15 (testimony of witness Linda
Menghetti).
153 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014, H.R. 3830, 113th Congo
(2014); Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014, S.1900, 113th Congo
(2014). The bills are identical.
154 H.R. 3830 § 4(d)(I)(A).
155 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 136.
156 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993), Ch. 11 (also available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-
111.asp).
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investment treaties have forged ties between developed and developing nations,
including over forty to which the U.S. is a party. IS?
In the mid-90s, negotiators began work on a multilateral agreement on
investment, known as the MAl, which would replace the network of bilateral
investment treaties and establish a common system.':" The United States, as the
largest investor and recipient of foreign investment, lobbied actively for such an
agreement to be put into place.1S9
The MAl was negotiated within the Paris-based Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, a relatively low-profile international
institution dedicated to law-making, directed research, and "the creation of
communities of influence that set the agendas of international policy.,,16o Its
membership included most of the world's most affluent nations and some
developing countries. 161 Negotiations on the MAl began in 1995.162Participation
in the talks was limited, however, and some parties were concerned that
excluding the majority of developing countries would stall acceptance of an
accord. According to a Wall Street Journal report, the negotiating countries
intended to seek some participation from "strong non-member economies" such
as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, and later confer with other nations,
including China, India, South Africa, and Israel. 163 Sir Leon Brittan, the top trade
negotiator for the European Commission, suggested that there should be parallel
157 See TRADE AGREEMENTS COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, OFFICE OF TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, http://tcc.export.govffrade_AgreementslExporters_GuideslList_All_Guides/
exp_002640.asp (last visited Jul. 24, 2014); see also DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE &
WATKINS, supra note 136,at 137.
158 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136,at 140-141.
159Id at 141.
160 James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and
Influence ofthe Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 769, 773 (2000).
161 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 149. The OECD
member nations, as of the spring of 1995, were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the U.S. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, MEMBERS AND PARTNERS, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersand partners/list-
oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited Jul. 24, 2014). Today the membership also
includes Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Poland, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.Id.
162 See OECD Negotiations Begin on Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
AGENCE EUROPE, Oct. 4, 1995.
163 Eduardo Lachica, OEeD Nations Ask Outsiders to Join Investment Treaty, WALL
ST. 1., Nov. 9, 1995,at A17.
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negotiations in the WTO, with its far larger membership, "in order to involve the
developing countries and not to present a treaty to them as a fait accompli.t"?"
In January 1997, the OECD Secretariat had produced a first draft of the
MAI. 165 Before that draft was distributed, however, a Canadian citizen's group
acquired and released a working draft of the agreement not intended for
publication.l'" In April, the draft agreement was parsed on the front page of
Canada's Globe and Mail newspaper.l'" Many groups cheered the leak "as the
first step in tearing down the wall of secrecy cloaking the talks.,,168 The leaked
document spread widely online, increasing awareness of the negotiations among
politicians and other NGOS.169 Its usefulness, however, was limited by its shady
origins. In the words ofone negotiator:
The OECD, like the WTO, has a policy of restricting certain documents,
and who knows, maybe the days are numbered for that process. So
suddenly, this document appeared on the Internet-everybody had a
copy. It was complicated by the fact that it did not remain the right
version for long. At each monthly meeting, pieces of the text were
renegotiated intensively while the NGOs were still wanting to talk about
this document that was no longer relevant. 170
The MAl's critics were a mixed group, including major labor unions,
the Sierra Club, and the Western Governors' Association.!" These organizations
shared concerns about how the MAl could allow business interests to curtail
national sovereignty and elevate "the rights of investors above those of
governments, local communities, citizens, workers and the environment.v'{' The
164 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 155. The United States,
however, did not support this position. ld
165 Id at 161.
166 Id. The U.S. group Public Citizen also obtained a copy of the leaked draft,
"replete with contradictions," and helped speed its spread online. See Stephen J. Kobrin,
The MAl and the Clash ofGlobalizations, FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1998, at 98.
167 See Laura Eggertson, Treaty to Trim Ottawa's Power: Equal Treatment Rules for
Foreign Firms Could Limit Research, Job-Creation Targets, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada),
Apr. 3, 1997, at AI.
168 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 161.
169 ld at 162.
170 l d at 161-162.
171 See Kobrin, supra note 166, at 98.
172 JOINT NGD STATEMENT ON THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
(Oct. 27, 1997), available at http://www.gp.org/positionlmai.shtml (hereinafter JOINT
NGD STATEMENT); WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
ON INVESTMENT: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1997). The
Western Governors' Association report concluded that the MAl "may protect investors
by curtailing both sovereign powers and sovereign immunity." Id
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leak of the draft agreement also triggered wider dismay over the exclusivity and
secrecy of the negotiations. A Canadian House of Commons trade subcommittee
issued a critical report recommending that in the future, "the government should
undertake an open and transparent process so that public disclosure and consulta-
tions can be carried out in a timely manner, to the extent that this is strategically
possible."173
Margrete Strand, of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, noted that
there had been selective access afforded to the business community, which was
particularly offensive: "The fact that business had a seat at the table and we
didn't-I think it raised the stakes and got both NGOs and activists incredibly
angry. Whatever happened to democracyv't " Yet even after the negotiations
came under scrutiny from activists, largely online, the MAl received scant atten-
tion from major news outlets in the U.S., marginalizing the agreement's detrac-
tors. By the end of 1997, as one commenter noted, "neither The New York Times,
The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, nor The Los Angeles
Times has devoted a full news story to [the MAl]. Many in Congress complain
they have been left in the dark. A State Department spokesman dismisses the
people pummeling the MAl on the Internet as 'the flat earth and black helicopter
crowd. ",175
OECD negotiators were surprised by the negative response. They also
disputed that the talks were secretive or exclusive. Rainer Geiger, an DECD
deputy director, suggested that "In hindsight, the participating governments
made a mistake in negotiating within tightly set deadlines without exposing key
concepts of the agreement to public debate at an early stage."!" He argued,
however, that "Public information was available early in the process and
business and trade unions were informed and consulted through their advisory
bodies at OECD. Nonmember countries were aware of the MAl negotiations
through regular briefings after each meeting of the Negotiating Group and were
consulted through regional meetings held in Latin America, Asia, and Africa."!"
173 Heather Scoffield, Ottawa Chided for Secrecy in Trade Talks, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada),Dec. 12, 1997,at B6.
174 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136,at 163.
175 Peter Beinart, The Next NAFTA, NEW REpUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1997,at 45.
176 Rainer Geiger, Toward a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL
INT'LL.J. 467,474 (1998)
177 Id.; see also William Crane, Note, Corporations Swallowing Nations: The OECD
and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 9 COLO. 1. INT'L L. 429, 437 (1998)
(describing GECD meetings with investmentpolicy officials at workshops and symposia
in 1997).
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The talks had been announced at their imtiation, although the
announcement received little media attention. 178 Yet the public was not, as a
general matter, welcome to attend or observe OECD meetings.i" Furthermore,
at the time, OECD internal documents could not be publicly released without
"derestriction," or approval from all Member countries. 180 This process afforded
the OECD's working papers the ability to "be quite explicit with pointed recom-
mendations and detailed case studies. As a result, internal drafts may differ from
public OECD documents. Derestriction can sometimes result in lengthy internal
negotiations prior to publication (and some contentious reports are never
publishedj/'':" Moreover, "[t]hese restrictions on documents prevent the public
from tracking the development of the OECD's policies, which in tum diminishes
the public's ability to influence international trade decision-making.t''V
In May 1997, the negotiations were extended for one year with
instructions from OECD to consult with "civil society.,,183 Later that year, the
OECD held informal discussions with representatives from about 50 NGOS.184
The discussions were not productive; the NGOs subsequently released a
statement promising to campaign against the MAl unless substantive changes
were made. I8S The statement specifically requested that the OECD "Increase
transparency in the negotiations by publicly releasing the draft texts and
individual reservations and by scheduling a series of on going [sic] public
meetings and hearings in both member and non member [sic] countries, open to
the media, parliamentarians and the general public.,,186
By 1998 the OECD had established an official website for its work on
the MAl, including the agreement's mandate, annual reports from the MAl
negotiating group, the draft text, and a list of frequently asked questions. 187
178 See DEeD Negotiations Begin on Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
AGENCE EUROPE, Oct. 4, 1995; DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at
168.
179 See Housman, supra note 46, at 717 (writing in 1994 that "[t]he public is also
restricted from attending most OECD meetings. OECD ministerial meetings are closed to
everyone but the delegationsof its members.").
180 Salzman, supra note 160, at 778; Housman, supra note 46, at 716.
181 Salzman, supra note 160, at 778.
182 Houseman, supra note 46, at 716.
183 DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 167.
184 Id at 167.
185 JOINTNGO STATEMENT, supra note 172.
186 Id
187 Although the original OECD website for the MAl is no longer live, it may be
viewed (circa 1998) via the Wayback Machine on Archive.org, using the following URL:
http://www.oecd.org/daflcmis/mai/reports.htm. See also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT:
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These efforts were insufficient, however, to make up for the agreement's poor
first impression. In the spring of 1998 the OECD announced that negotiators
would take a six-month pause to allow "for consultation among the parties 'with
interested parts of their societies. ",188 No further work was done on the agree-
ment and negotiations formally ceased in December 1998.189 While the well-
organized and internet-savvy NGOs were not the sole cause of the MAl's
failure, their protest and their focus on transparency played an important role in
undermining the agreement.
Although the MAl negotiations failed to produce a comprehensive,
high-quality agreement on the regulation of foreign direct investment, the
process did spur changes in information handling within OECD. In July 1997,
the OECD Council repealed its thirty five-year-old document classification
policy, opting to consider information unclassified until determined otherwise. 190
B. Transparency at the WTO
With the benefit of hindsight, it is somewhat ironic that early critics of
the MAl negotiation process held hopes that negotiations at the WTO would be
less likely to engender conflict. Within just a few years, the WTO would be
synonymous with public protest.
Like the GATT, the WTO's goal has been to provide for competitive,
predictable, and non-discriminatory trade between nations through agreements,
monitoring, and dispute resolution.':" While it has functioned well as a check on
national protectionism, it has also been denounced by some outside groups
DOCUMENTATION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/
mai/htm/2.htm (last visitedJul. 24, 2014).
188 Kobrin,supra note 166,at 98.
189 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: DOCUMENTATION FROM THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm (last visited Jul. 24,2014).
190 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Council Resolution
on the Classification and Declassification of Information, C(97)64/REVI/FINAL (Jul. 4,
2008). Note that, within OECD, "declassification should not be confused with the
dissemination or wider distribution of material. There is no obligation to distribute
material, whether Unclassified at origin or subsequently declassified." OECD, Council
Resolution on the Classification and Declassification of Information, C(97)64/FINAL
Annex, Guidelines/or Implementation, para. 9. "The question of the wider dissemination
of the material, whatever form it may take ... is a separate issue, to be addressed in the
context of the Organisation's overall information and publications policy." Id at para. 10.
191 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WHAT Is THE WTO? WHAT WE Do,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm (last visited Jul. 24,
2014). The WTO has in large part realizeda foundational goal to become a "virtual treaty
machine[]."Alvarez,supra note 25, at 221.
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arguing that it lacks accountability and "is merely a front for multinational
corporations and dehumanizing capitalist values.,,192 Conservative scholar
Claude Barfield characterized the WTO's loudest NGO critics as "politically and
rhetorically powerful 'citizen activists,'" many of which "directly challenge the
predominant capitalist beliefs of wealth creation.,,193 The WTO's 1999 Minister-
ial in Seattle was famously disrupted by large-scale protests.!" The secrecy of
the organization's proceedings was an especially sore point, such that even
President Bill Clinton remarked that '''the sooner the W.T.O. opens up the
process of rule-making to outside groups, 'we'll see less demonstrations and
more constructive debate. '" 195 Shortly after its formation, the WTO adopted
procedures for offering limited public access to its documents. 196
Initially, all WTO working documents were derestricted only upon
adoption of the a final report or decision, or were considered for derestriction six
months after having been circulated to WTO-member's delegations, whichever
came earlier.l'" After the debacle in Seattle, WTO members changed the policy
to expand public access to their documents.l'" The current regime calls for all
official WTO documents to be unrestricted by default, subject to various
exceptions (such as the minutes of meetings, which are restricted but subject to
automatic derestriction 45 days after circulation).199
The role of NGOs within the WTO remains less than satisfactory for
both sides. In a 2012 working paper, the WTO's Economic Research and
Statistics Division concluded that the WTO had done all that it could to engage
192 Barfield, supra note 78, at 403 (2001).
193Id at 405.
194 See Same Howe Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard is Called to
Quell Trade-Talk Protests; Seattle is Under Curfew After Disruptions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1999, at A14.
195 David E. Sanger, Talks and Turmoil: The Overview; President Chides World
Trade Body in Stormy Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at AI.
196 Elizabeth Smythe & Peter J. Smith, Legitimacy, Transparency, and Information
Technology: The World Trade Organization in an Era of Contentious Trade Politics,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Jan.-Mar. 2006, at 41.
197 See World Trade Organization, Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction
ofWTO Documents, WTIL/160IRev.1 (2006).
198 Maria Perez-Esteve, WTO Rules and Practices for Transparency and Engagement
with Civil Society Organizations, WorId Trade Organization Staff Working Paper,
ERSD-2012-14 at 7 (2012). The WTO's website is the primary access point for its
official documents; traffic on the site increased significantly after the Seattle ministerial.
See Smythe & Smith, supra note 196, at 42.
199 See World Trade Organization, Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction
ofWTO Documents, WTIL/452 (2002).
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with civil society groups within the limits of its mandate and organizational
structure. 200
Although nobody contests the added value that greater participation of
NGOs would bring to the work of the WTO including, [sic] additional
information and technical expertise, on-the-ground experience, perspec-
tives that transcend national interests in dealing with economically and
politically sensitive issues, and enhanced accountability of the WTO to
the public at large, there are certain WTO members that challenge
NGOs' direct involvement in the WTO, particularly in the decision-
making process .... The reluctance to reconsider WTO procedures on
relations with NGOs and civil society actors is due to a lack of
consensus among Members.i'"
Instead, the paper suggests that NGOs can most effectively influence
trade policy formulation at the WTO by lobbying its constituent governments;
"[t]his practice has enabled NGOs to provide governments with expertise,
training and policy advice at different levels.,,202 This presumes, however, that
NGOs will have greater access to relevant information about decision-making at
the national level. As the FTAA, ACTA and TPP negotiations demonstrate, this
may not always be the case.
c. The Free Trade Area of the Americas
The Free Trade Area of the Americas began at a meeting of presidents
from western hemisphere nations in 1994.203 As originally conceived, the FTAA
200 See Perez-Esteve, supra note 198, at 3.
201 Id This lack ofconsensus may be attributable in part to power imbalances among
the WTO's member states, and the potential for some member states to fear further
marginalization from outside groups. Smythe and Smith have noted that certain
"developing country members, such as India and Malaysia, see increased transparency as
a stalking horse for powerful, primarily Northern members .... The lack of progress on
fairly basic principles of transparency in decisionmaking procedures reflects enormous
challenges ahead to reform internal processes, made more urgent with the increased
membership and huge majority of developing countries [in the WTO]." Smythe & Smith,
supra note 196, at 45; see also Barfield, supra note 78, at 405-406 ("Though many
NGOs are local and small, the environmental and consumer groups that have taken the
lead in challenging the WTO and the doctrine of free trade have very large budgets and
payrolls and operate in many countries ....These formidable resources mean that the
largest and most powerful NGOs can heavily outmatch the resources that many members
of the WTO can bring to bear. .. "),
202 Perez-Esteve, supra note 198, at 25.
203 See DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY & PRAC-
TICE 263 (2009).
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would be based on NAFTA and would create a free trade area for goods and
services, agriculture, investment, IP, government procurement, competition
rules, and dispute resolution stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.204 It
would weave together the seven regional trade agreements and over 25 bilateral
trade agreements then existing between the participating countries.i'"
After several initial discussion rounds, academics and NGOs repre-
senting organized labor and environmental interests were invited to contribute to
the FTAA ministerial held in Toronto in 1999.206 The experience, unfortunately,
contributed "little real dialogue.v''" A Committee of Government Representa-
tives on the Participation of Civil Society was created to receive and distribute
submissions from interested parties.i'" From 1998 to 2002, however, the
Committee "seemed to serve as little more than a post office box" for civil
society groups.i'" The process was criticized as being "undifferentiated (it dealt
with all issues that may arise from civil society without specialization), uni-
directional (comments were a one-way street with no response from government
and no dialog), and superficial (no depth of expertise was expressed or implied
in the committee itself).,,210 The Committee eventually took it upon itself to
broaden its role, holding periodic "issue meetings" and even becoming "some-
thing of an advocate for integrating citizens in the administration of the
FTAA.,,211
Meetings of the ministers negotiating the agreement were routinely met
with demonstrations. In addition to "the usual protests, riots and tear gas that
have marked every major trade meeting since the World Trade Organization's
disastrous ministerial in Seattle in 1999,,,212 protesters specifically demanded the
release of the draft agreement, arguing that the negotiations were "undemocratic
and secretive.,,213
204 See id.; Kevin C. Kennedy, The FTAA Negotiations: A Melodrama in Five Acts,
1 Loy. INT'L L. REv. 121, 121-122 (2004). All nations in the western hemisphere,
excluding Cuba, were represented.
205 Kennedy, supra note 204, at 122.
206 Eric Dannenmaier, Trade, Democracy, and the FTAA: Public Access to the
Process of Constructing a Free Trade Area 0.[the Americas, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1066, 1089 (2004).
207 Id.
208 Kennedy, supra note 204, at 126-127; see also Dannenmaier, supra note 206, at
1080-1081.
209 Dannenmaier, supra note 206, at 1081.
210 Id
211 Id at 1081-1082.
212 Helene Cooper, Officials Plan to Disclose Draft on Pan-American Free Trade
Talks, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 9, 2001, at A4.
213 Dozens of Anti-Free Trade Protesters Arrested in Ottawa, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Apr. 2, 2001,7:44 PM GMT.
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In a slow, methodical routine, protesters approached the barricades [sur-
rounding Canada's International Trade Department] two at a time and
read out a statement about why they want the text released. They then
climbed over the metal blockades and sat down on the grass, ignoring
police demands that they retreat. In a scene repeated many times, police
dragged the demonstrators away.214
Days later, after repeated protests and presumably some internal
wrangling, ministers from all 34 participating countries reached consensus on
making the negotiating text public.i" Calling the publication "an unprecedented
effort to make international trade and its economic and social benefits more
understandable to the public," United States Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick added that "This is an important step in an international trade negotia-
tion-to make public at such an early stage the text under negotiation ... we
believe that the availability of the text will increase public awareness of and
support for the FTAA.,,216
The initial and subsequent drafts were published on a website created
for the nascent agreement.i" In addition to issuing a press release, the USTR
published a notice and request for comment on the draft in the Federal Regi-
ster.218 Many of the most important provisions, however, were bracketed, indica-
ting that the parties had not agreed to the language.i" No interpretation was
included that might identify the technical issues that prompted the bracketing. 220
This meant that the disclosed text was disappointingly hypothetical.r"
Unlike representatives from industry, civil society groups struggled to
gain an in-person audience with FTAA negotiators for most of the time that the
agreement was in play.222 In November 2003, however, NGO representatives
214Id. ("Protest organizers said earlier that they would attempt to retrieve the draft
text from the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Building.").
215 See Cooper, supra note 212, at A4.
216 Press Release, United States Trade Representative, USTR Zoellick Says
Publication of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Will Help Explain Trade
Benefits (Jul. 3, 2001).
217 See ALCA-FTAA-ZLEA OFFICIAL WEBSITE, DRAFT FTAA AGREEMENT,
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadrafts_e.asp (last visited Jul. 24, 2014; site last
updated on June 21, 2006).
218 66 Fed. Reg. 36614 (July 12,2001).
219 See Kennedy, supra note 204, at 128. ("Although I have not actually counted, I
have heard that there are over 7,000 brackets in the draft text.").
220 Dannenmaier, supra note 206, at 1082-1083. The USTR did publish "[o]verall
U.S. Government positions on the substantive areas covered by the FTAA negotiations"
on its website. See 66 Fed. Reg. 36614 (July 12,2001).
221 Dannenmaier, supra note 206, at 1083.
222 I d. at 1085.
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were for the first time invited inside the "hard security perimeter" at the Eighth
Meeting of Trade Ministers of the Americas in Miami to communicate directly
with negotiators.r" By that point, however, things were not looking good for the
FTAA. Its negotiation had overlapped with the WTO's Doha development
round, which collapsed when the participants could not agree on thorny issues
like investment and competition policy.224 Brazil and the United States did not
agree on the scope of the agreement.225 The negotiations were eventually
suspended in 2004.226
While transparency issues emerged during the FTAA negotiations, they
did not play the role in shaping the historical narrative about the agreement that
they did in the case of the MAL Ironically, because of the voluntary release of
the draft agreement at a mid-point of negotiations, the FTAA is now more likely
to be cited as a positive example oftransparency in action.227
D. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is a multilateral agreement
focused specifically on intellectual property enforcement measures in the context
of international trade.228 The USTR participated in the negotiations and signed
the final agreement on behalf of President Obama in October 2011.229 While it
was being negotiated, however, ACTA became increasingly controversial. This
was in large part attributable to the secrecy with which it was negotiated.r" After
a draft of the agreement was leaked in early 2010, it came under intense scrutiny
223 Id at 1104-1105.
224 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round
Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT'L LJ. 573, 578-579 (2010).
225 See GANTZ, supra note 203, at 266-268. As an aside about the importance of
looking at such agreements in context: shortly before the talks were suspended, Brazilian
Ambassador Adhemar Bahadian was quoted in a newspaper comparing the FTAA to "a
stripper in a cheap cabaret. At night under dim lights, she is a goddess. But in the daytime
she is something different. Maybe not even a woman." Id. at 268.
226 See id. at 269.
227 See notes 304-306, infra, and accompanying text.
228 See Kimberlee Weatherall, Three Lessonsfrom ACTA and Its Political Aftermath,
35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 575,575 (2012). ACTA was negotiated by the United
States, Japan, Australia, twenty-seven countries within the European Union, Switzerland,
Canada, Singapore, South Korea, New Zealand, Morocco, and Mexico. Id
229 See id. at 575; UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA), http://www.ustr.gov/acta(last visited Jul. 24, 2014).
230 See Weatherall, supra note 228, at 576-577; Margot E. Kaminski, The US. Trade
Representative's Democracy Problem: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) as a Juncture for International Lawmaking in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 519,529 (2012).
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from civil society groups concerned that its provisions were inconsistent with
existing IP laws, particularly those in the U.S. and European Union.r"
After announcing its intention to participate in ACTA negotiations,
USTR proceeded with minimal contact with the public. 232 Aside from the
occasional press release, USTR was a black box. The "cloak-and-dagger aura"
of the talks fueled fears and rumors about the agreement's contents.r''' Newspa-
pers published stories suggesting that the agreement would give customs
officials the right to search travelers' laptops and mobile phones for illegally-
downloaded content, and expose internet service providers and social media sites
to new liabilities for user content.234 The exclusion ofdeveloping nations thought
to be IP-infringers created additional tension.r" An email eventually turned over
by USTR in partial response to a FOIA request revealed that the lead negotiator
was not terribly sympathetic to the concerns of outsiders; he offered suggestions
for appeasing NOOs as "possible ingredients" in a "transparency SOUp.,,236
The public outcry over the secrecy of the negotiations reached such a
volume that the chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America (an
organization staunchly in favor of strong IP protections, as well as a member of
USTR's intellectual property ITAC237) wrote to the USTR in November 2009
urging him to provide "meaningful opportunities for the public to provide
input.,,238 In March and September 2010, the European Parliament issued
231 Weatherall,supra note 228, at 577.
232 Press Release, United States Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab
Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007)
(available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-
trade-agreement-fight-fakes). The USTR did post an initial solicitation for public
comment regarding the U.S. agenda for ACTA in the Federal Register in February 2008.
See 73 Fed. Reg. 8910 (Feb. 15,2008). The USTR also held a two-hour public meeting
"to inform stakeholders about ACTA and to receive comments from stakeholders about
their views regarding this initiative" later that year. 73 FED. REG. 51860 (Sept. 5, 2008).
233 Yu, supra note 14,at 998.
234 See, e.g., Security Talks Prompt Laptop Fears, CANBERRA TIMES, Jul. 6, 2008, at
A28; Aislinn Simpson, Customs Officials May Check iPods, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jui. 11,2008, at 6.
235 See Weatherall,supra note 228, at 577.
236 Email from Stanford McCoy, Assistant U.S. Trade Representativefor Intellectual
Property and Innovation,to Elizabeth Baltzan et al., Feb. 10,2009, 4:29 PM, available at
http://keionline.org/sites/defaultJfiles/stand_mccoy_transparency_soup.pdf (last visited
Jul. 24, 2014); see also David S. Levine, Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating
Process and "Black Box" Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 811,813-814 (2011).
237 See U.S. INT'L TRADE ADMINISTRATION, INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ITAC 15, http://ita.doc.gov/itac/
committees/itacI5.asp (last visited Jul. 24,2014).
238 Yu, supra note 14,at 999.
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statements on the lack of a transparent process for concluding the agreement and
called for the immediate publication of all documents related to the negotia-
tions.239 This was shortly after the crucial Internet chapter of the draft agreement
was leaked online,240 and just days before a leak of the chapters on international
cooperation and institutional issues.i'" The negotiating parties eventually agreed
to publish the draft text officially in April 2010, but without indication of
country positions on bracketed issues.242 Eight months later the USTR published
a request for written comments on the text in the Federal Register but noted that
the negotiations were concluded and that the text was fina1.243
As David Levine has pointed out, the USTR insisted on a level of
secrecy during the ACTA negotiations unmatched by any of the major IP treaty
bodies, including the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization,
and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.244 Yet, despite
seeking a strictly closed-off negotiating space, USTR and its counterparts needed
over three years to reach an agreement.245 "[T]he fact that WIPO and WTO are
more transparent, yet have been able to facilitate the conclusion of major recent
international IP agreements in comparable or less time than ACTA," he
239 See European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and
State of Play of the ACTA Negotiations, P7_TA(20 10)0058 (Mar. 10, 2010); Declaration
of the European Parliament of 9 September 2010 on the Lack of a Transparent Process
for Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Potentially Objectionable
Content, P7_TA(2010)0317 (Sept. 9,2010).
240 E.g., Nate Anderson, World, Get Ready for the DMCA: ACTA's Internet Chapter
Leaks, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 22, 2010, 2:23 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/201OI02/world-get-ready-for-the-dmca-actas-intemet-chapter-leaksl.
241 Cory Doctorow, New ACTA Leak: It's a Screwjob for the World's Poorest
Countries, BOINGBOING (Mar. 19, 2010, 9:02 AM), http://boingboing.net/2010/03/-
19/new-acta-Ieak-its-a.html.
242 See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Under Scrutiny,
ACTA Negotiators Release Draft Text, BRIDGES, Apr. 21,2010, available at http://www.
ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/under-scrutiny-acta-negotiators-release-draft-text.
243 75 Fed. Reg. 79069 (Dec. 17,2010). Note that the USTR did publish an earlier
version of the text on its website in April 2010. See UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, PREVIOUS ACTA TEXTS, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/intellectual-
property/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-actalprevious-acta-texts (last visited Jul. 24,
2014).
244 Levine, supra note 236, at 831.
245 The agreement was first proposed by Japan in 2005, and the US formally joined
negotiations in 2007. See Yu, supra note 14, at 980-984. The agreement went through
eleven rounds of negotiations and was signed in October 20 11. Weatherall, supra note
228, at 575.
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concluded "challenges the notion that secrecy inevitably leads to a streamlined
and efficient negotiating process in IP lawmaking. ,,246
The controversy surrounding ACTA's formative years has indelibly
tainted the agreement, as even today it "continues to be seen as the 'secret'
treaty.,,247 Critics of the agreement effectively linked its enforcement provisions
to those found in aggressive and widely-reviled domestic legislation, specifically
the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PIPA).248 In Europe,
the effort to secure European Parliament approval for ACTA met with strong
resistance, including massive street protests and a petition opposing its adoption
sporting two million signatures.i" These efforts led the European Parliament to
reject the agreement in June 2012?50 ACTA will not enter into force until six
instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval are deposited with the
Japanese government. 25 I Meanwhile, its status remains uncertain.
246 Levine, supra note 236, at 832.
247 Weatherall, supra note 228, at 592.
248 See id. at 580-586; see also Levine, supra note 123, at 137-140; Yu, supra note 1,
at 1172:
In the United States, the entertainment industry's push for controversial
domestic copyright legislation, such as [SOPAIPIPA], also led to an unprecedented,
massive service blackout launched by Wikipedia, Reddit, WordPress, and other
internet companies. This blackout, in tum, caused Congressional representatives to
quickly withdraw their support for the controversial bills, leading SOPA and PIPA to
die in the 112th Congress. As Senator Ron Wyden succinctly summarized in his
reminder to then-USTR Ronald Kirk in a Senate Finance Committee hearing, "[t[he
nonn changed on Jan. 18, 2012, when millions and millions of Americans said we
will not accept being locked out ofdebates about Internet freedom."
249 Yu, supra note 1, at 1171.
250Id
251 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (May 2011), Article 40, para. 1, available
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i-property/pdfs/actall05_en.pdf (last visited
Jul. 24, 2014). Note that the USTR insisted, until 2012, that no domestic legislative action
regarding ACTA would be necessary because ACTA was negotiated as a sole executive
agreement. See Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutionality Problem: The Treaty is not a
Treaty, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 903,916-919 (2011). The administration later changed
its position, arguing that it had negotiated with ex ante Congressional authorization under
the 2008 PRO-IP Act. Kaminski, supra note 230, at 523.
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E. The Trans-Pacific Partnership
The TPP began as preferential trade agreement between Chile, New
Zealand, Singapore, and eventually Brunei.252 In 2008, the outgoing Bush
administration announced its intention to join the negotiations.P'' in part due to
concerns that the U.S. could be excluded from a growing network of bilateral
and regional trade agreements being negotiated among Asian and Pacific-rim
countries. 254
The Doha round of negotiations at the WTO was falling apart and
policy-makers in the U.S. viewed the TPP as an alternative way to open markets
and maintain U.S. access to goods, services, and investment opportunities.v ' At
the behest of the United States, each of the negotiating parties has signed a
confidentiality agreement, requiring them to hold the "negotiating texts, propo-
sals of each Government, accompanying explanatory material, emails related to
the substance of the negotiations, and other information exchanged in the context
of the negotiations" in confidence until the agreement is concluded.i" The
confidentiality agreement further stipulates that all of these documents must also
be kept confidential for at least four years after the treaty comes into force, or, if
the treaty is never ratified, for four years after the final round of negotiations.i"
In keeping with this agreement, no official version of the draft text has ever been
released.
252 See Yu, supra note 1, at 1130. In addition to the treaties and dispute resolution
conducted under the auspices of the WTO, the expanding network of preferential trade
agreements (often abbreviated "PTAs") complicates the governance of international
trade. At the time the WTO was created in 1995, there were about 50 active PTAs; that
number had quadrupled by 2008. Henrik Hom, Petros C. Mavroidis & Andre Sapir,
Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements, 33
WORLD ECON. 1565,1565 (2010).
253 Press Release, United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partners and
United States Launch FTA Negotiations (Sept. 22, 2008).
254 See The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Challenges and Potential:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Congo 8 (May 17, 2012) (testimony of Susan C.
Schwab, former United States Trade Representative).
255 1d.
256 See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, TRANS-
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The USTR has repeatedly pointed out that it has invited civil society
actors to present to negotiators at TPP negotiating sessions.i" While there have
been fora provided for NGOs and other interested parties at negotiation rounds,
the level of access to negotiators and the time provided for presentations has
varied, and many attending stakeholders have expressed disappointment with the
process. Accommodations for public stakeholders appear to becoming more
limited as the talks wear on. For example, at the TPP's 19th round ofnegotia-
tions in Brunei, Knowledge Ecology's Krista Cox reported that the logistics and
schedule of the meeting made meaningful interactions with the national
delegations difficult.259
Initially, we were told that there would be no tables and no presenta-
tions, a huge change from any of the previous rounds. At the last
minute, and with just two days of notice, we were told that we could
register to make presentations. However, the presentations are limited to
7 minutes each, less than half of the 15 minutes we have been tradi-
tionally allotted at the most recent TPP rounds, and quite a bit less than
the 20 minutes allotted at some early rounds. It is obviously quite
difficult to give a presentation when only allotted a 7 minute speaking
slo1.260
After attending a four-day TPP ministerial in Singapore in December
2013 Australian public health scholar Deborah Gleeson reported that, unlike
258 See, e.g., Press Release, United States Trade Representative, USTR Ron Kirk
Comments on Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks (June 18, 2010) ("I am particularly proud
of the degree to which USTR kept President Obama's promise this week to conduct trade
talks in a new way, by inviting u.s. stakeholders to be on-site throughout these
negotiations and ensuring that Americans who want to help shape u.s. trade policy had
the chance to be heard."); Press Release, USTR Statement Regarding the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Negotiations (Sept. 5, 2011) ("We have invited stakeholder attendance during
every subsequent round [of negotiations]. Thanks to this and other outreach, we already
have had considerable input from the broadest range of stakeholders..."); Press Release,
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Talks Advance in Texas (May 16, 2012) ("At this round,
the United States introduced a new format for negotiators to engage with the more than
300 stakeholders from the United States and other TPP countries who accepted the U.s.
government's invitation to be on-site throughout the talks.").
259 Krista Cox, Updates from the 19th Round of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agree-
ment (TPP) Negotiations in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.keionline.org/node/1788; see also Jeremy
Malcolm, Questions Remain-Civil Society Media Releasefrom TPP Negotiation Round,
Brunei Darassalam, CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 29, 2013), http://a2knetwork.
orglquestions-remain-civil-society-media-release-tpp-negotiation-round-brunei-
darassalam.
260 Cox, supra note 259.
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earlier rounds, "[t]his time stakeholders had no role as particrpants and no
avenues for interacting with negotiators except through personal contacts. It was
clear that ministers were getting down to business. And it was even more
difficult than usual to get any information about what was happening.v'"
In this way, the TPP negotiations represent the USTR's commitment to
private negotiations in the face of multi-faceted opposition, which "shows that
the lessons of the ACTA are not being learned.,,262 For starters, efforts to
preserve the secrecy of negotiations have not prevented information about the
agreement in progress from becoming public. Excerpts from the text were first
leaked in February 2011, spurring a flurry of interest in the agreement.i'" In
November 2013, WikiLeaks published the intellectual property chapter, which
had purportedly been distributed to negotiators earlier that year. 264 The leaked
draft included detailed footnotes and annotations describing each party's position
on many sensitive topics. These leaks have sparked further negative press.i'"
Politicians and civil society groups in the US and other countries have
been expressing frustration with the secrecy of the process and asking for the
publication of an official draft of the TPp. 266 In May 2012, 36 law professors
261 Deborah Gleeson, Update from the Latest Trans Pacific Partnership Meeting,
THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 12, 2013, 5:26 AM GMT), http://theconversation.coml-
update- from-the-Iatest-trans-pacific-partnership-meeting-21416. Dr. Gleeson noted in the
same blog post that the Australian government had recently blocked an order by its
Senate to publish the TPP text prior to conclusion of the agreement.
262 Weatherall, supra note 228, at 601.
263 A thorough collection of leaked drafts and chapters of the TPP, alongside
commentaries and analysis, is available from InfoJustice.org, a website hosted by the
American University Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, at
http://infojustice.org/resource-Iibrary/tpp#.
264 See Margot Kaminski, Capture, Sunlight, and the TPP Leak, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.comlarchives/2013/11-
/capture-sunlight-and-the-tpp-Ieak.html.
265 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-ed., No Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at
A23; Michael Geist, Op-Ed., TPP Remains Largely Hiddenfrom Public View, TORONTO
STAR, Jul. 5,2014, at B7; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Op-Ed., On the Wrong Side ofGlobaliza-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,2014, Sunday Rev. pg. 12.
266 For example, a group of parliamentarians from TPP-participating nations signed a
joint letter seeking access to the text "before any final agreement is signed with sufficient
time to enable effective legislative scrutiny and public debate." TPP LEGISLATORS FOR
TRANSPARENCY, http://www.tppmpsfortransparency.org/ (last visited Jul. 24,2014).
The Australian Pirate Party has been petitioning the Australian government for
information about the TPP since 2012~ the Guardian newspaper also made Freedom of
Information Act requests, quickly funded by crowdsourcing. See Brendan Molloy, Why
Can't Australian Citizens Read the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?
TheGuardian.com (Oct. 29, 2013 11:11 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.comlcom-
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wrote a joint letter to the USTR criticizing its moves to scale back public
participation at negotiating rounds and refusal to release information about the
agreement under FOIA on national security grounds. "While we are sympathetic
to the need for some confidentiality in the negotiation of international agree-
ments, just as there is in domestic law-making," they wrote, "there can be no
national security justification, much less one sounding in good governance
concerns, for preventing the United States public from seeing its own govern-
ment's proposals to restrain its own domestic legislation.,,267
The TPP is a substantially different agreement than ACTA, but its
potential impact on domestic IP law (among other things) has agitated many of
the same activists that protested the ACTA negotiations.i'" For example, a
leaked version of the TPP's intellectual property chapter raises issues about
copyright damages, access to medicines, the patenting of surgical methods,
intermediary liability, and other issues that are likely to remain challenging.i'"
The concerns are not limited to IP. Senator Elizabeth Warren, has publicly
worried that the negotiations could allow large banks to avoid or roll back
mentisfree/2013/oct/30/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-dfat. Vermont state lawmakers, who
passed a resolution in 2013 asking the USTR to "respect the sovereignty of individual
states," refused to meet with USTR officials to discuss the TPP if the media would not be
permitted to attend. David Gram, Vt. Lawmakers Balk at No-Media Trade Talks, Assoc.
PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE, Feb. 7,2014,3:18 PM GMT.
267 Letter to Ron Kirk, United States Trade Representative, from Prof. David S.
Levine et al., May 9, 2012, available at http://infojustice.org/archives/21137 (last visited
Jul. 24,2014).
268 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Leaked! TPP: the Son ofACTA Will Oblige America
and Other Countries to Throw Out Privacy, Free Speech and Due Process for Easier
Copyright Enforcement, BOINGBOING (Aug. 25, 2012), http://boingboing.net/2012/
08/25/leaked-tpp-the-son-of-acta-w.html; Katitza Rodriguez & Maira Sutton, What is
TPP? Biggest Global Threat to the Internet Since ACTA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.efforg/deeplinks/2013/04/tpp-biggest-global-
threat-internet-acta; Glyn Moody, TPP IP Chapter Leaked, Confirming It's Worse Than
ACTA, TECHDIRT (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131113/
08405625230/tpp-ip-chapter-Ieaked-confirming-its-worse-than-acta.shtml.
269 See Miriam Bitton, Examining the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 17 1.
INTERNET L. 25, 33-36 (2014). The close relationship between industry, Congress, and
the USTR certainly creates the opportunity for IP-maximalist views to go unchallenged.
This opens the door for adoption of international rules that are more stringent than what
might feasibly pass public scrutiny in Congress. At a 2013 hearing, Sen. Orrin Hatch
asked David Hirschmann, a witness representing the Global Intellectual Property Center
at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, how the USTR could negotiate the most effectively
to benefit US IP-owners. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 113th Congo 15 (Apr. 24, 2013). "Just as
a matter of negotiating," Mr. Hirschmann replied, "U .S. negotiators should always start,
at a minimum, with U.S. law." Id (emphasis added).
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regulations under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.270 Warren voted against the confirmation of the current Trade Representa-
tive, Michael Froman, citing his refusal to make public the bracketed text for the
TPP or to share details about what information was going to the USTR's trade
advisers.i"
USTR has stated that its consultations with Congress satisfy any
objection that the TPP negotiations are un-democratic.i" The public record of
TPP-related Congressional hearings, however, suggests that selective access to
the text and other non-public information about the agreement creates informa-
tion disparities that make discussion less fruitful.
In December 2011, the House Ways and Means Committee's subcom-
mittee on trade held a hearing on the status of TPP negotiations. Deputy Trade
Representative Demetrios Marantis described how USTR had "undertaken
unprecedented outreach with stakeholders, and [] had input from a broader range
of groups than in any previous negotiation.Y" Yet in written testimony
submitted to the committee in connection with the same hearing, Krista Cox
outlined several concerns about the agreement's provisions on intellectual
property based on a leaked copy of the TPP's text, while reiterating that such
270 See Nomination of Fred P. Hochberg, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Congo 12 (May 7, 2013).
271 See Congo Rec. S4662 (daily ed. Jun. 19, 2013). Froman's nomination was
ultimately confirmed by a vote of93-4. Id. at S4663.
272 See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Op-Ed., Free Trade Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES.COM
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/opinion/edsall-free-trade-
disagreement.html?_r=l (quoting a USTR spokesperson: "Negotiators are available to
walk Members and committee staff through that text and have done so on request.
Moreover, USTR regularly briefs additional Congressional staff on the negotiations and
U.S. approaches, taking input there as well. All told, we've held more than 1,100
briefings on Capitol Hill on TPP alone.").
273 Hearing on Trans-Pacific Partnership, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Trade
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, I 12th Congo 13 (Dec. 14,2011). In addition to
hearing testimony from the deputy U.S. trade representative, the subcommittee invited
corporate representatives from Cargill, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores, and a public affairs con-
sulting firm to share their views. Cargill and Wal-Mart each favor the rapid conclusion of
the TPP (as they would envision it) as an essential tool to improve the American
economy and the business climate. Id. at 35, 43. Other contributors were limited to
offering written testimony; these witnesses advocated a balanced approach to IP enforce-
ment (The Computer & Communications Industry Association), id. at 78-81; greater
transparency in TPP negotiations and protection for access to medicines (the civil society
group Knowledge Ecology International), id. at 82; and exclusion of tobacco products
from favorable treatment under the agreement (a consortium of medical and public health
groups), id. at 93.
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leaks are "an infrequent and unreliable source and the public should not be
forced to rely on information through this channel.,,274
In an August 2013 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Rep. Brad
Sherman (D-Cal.), a critic ofU.S. free trade policy, expressed concerns about the
TPP and national security, but in a manner that illustrates the lack of concrete
information available: "I am told that, apparently, the USTR has agreed to text in
which our right to impose sanctions is subject to a tribunal's review ....This
agreement, therefore, poses a threat to our national security, as well as our
economy.t'i" Subcommittee chair Ted Poe (R-Tex) responded that this was
"exactly why we are having this hearing, to find out the good, the bad, and the
ugly about the TPP, to put it bluntly.,,276
But at no point in the hearing did the committee hear testimony from
any official TPP negotiators, or make reference to specific language in the draft
agreement.i" Witness Celeste Drake, representing the AFL-CIO, praised the
USTR for being "open and accessible," but expressed frustration that "based on
publicly available information, few, if any, of the detailed proposals we have
submitted have been translated into transformative changes in the still-secret
text.,,278 In response to a question from Congressman Sherman about potential
trade deficits, policy analyst Edward Gerwin declined to comment on the
grounds that "I don't know exactly what is being discussed in the current context
of the TPp.,,279
By contrast, in a Senate hearing on the agreement earlier that year, a
witness representing the Global Intellectual Property Center at the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, a large business lobbying organization, mentioned to the commit-
tee that "there are 29 chapters [in the TPP draft agreement], and we have teams
at the Chamber working on just about all of them.,,28o It should be noted that a
274Id at 83.
275 The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Outlook and Opportunities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 113th Congo3-4 (Aug. 1, 2013).
276Id at 4.
277 The USTR was reportedly invited to send a representative to testify at this
hearing, but declined. Id. at 60. (Rep. Poe: "[T]he United States Trade Representative
was invited to testify and refused to testify. You can take that however you want to take
it.") Later in the hearing, Rep. Poe asked the witnesses "Our negotiators, are they good
negotiators? Are diplomats negotiating this or do we have some horse traders in there
fighting for America? ld. at 64.
278 Id at 33.
279 Id at 59.
28°Id at 13.
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U.S. Chamber of Commerce executive currently sits on the USTR's Advisory
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.i'"
Speaking at a press conference in Kuala Lumpur, President Obama
addressed concerns about the TPP's impact on the costs of medical supplies by
suggesting that critics of the agreement are uninformed, Both IP protection and
humanitarian values "are reflecting in the conversations and negotiations that are
taking place around TPP. So the assumption that somehow that right off the bat
that's not something we're paying attention to, that reflects a lack of knowledge
of what is going on in the negotiations....you shouldn't be surprised if there are
going to be objections, protests, rumors, conspiracy theories, political aggrava-
tion around a trade deal.,,282 This sidesteps the fact that many objectors are
focused on the lack ofunmediated information available about the agreement.
As with the MAl and ACTA, the gap between the deal-makers
professions of transparency and the perceptions of its critics has created a
controversy that threatens to overshadow the substance of the agreement (to the
extent the substance is knowable to anyone outside of the negotiations). David
Levine's analysis of ACTA could just as easily describe the TPP and future
closed-door agreements: "[b]ecause of its forceful attempts to maintain unprece-
dented levels of secrecy, the USTR must expect a negative public reaction once
the existence of the negotiations is revealed. ,,283
VI. Shifting Definitions and Higher Expectations
These examples raise the question: when democratic diplomacy is
barely a century old, and the modem international trade regime is even younger,
is it fair to say that agreements like the TPP are being negotiated contrary to
precedent? As I seek to demonstrate in this analysis, trade negotiators like the
USTR and their critics are both correct within their own frames of reference. But
not only are the two sides measuring transparency by different standards, the
dynamism of information technology is creating an environment in which
conflict between these standards is increasingly likely and irreconcilable. When
281 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE
POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmental-affairs/
advisory-committees/advisory-committee-trade-policy-and-negotiati (last visited Jul. 24,
2014).
282 Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Najib of
Malaysia (Apr. 27, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/04/27/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-najib-
malaysia).
283 Levine, supra note 236, at 834.
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the League of Nations Charter was adopted in 1924, the idea that all concluded
treaties should be made public was novel and transformative.i'"
During the twentieth century, international lawmakers have begun
releasing agendas and statements to the press, addressing information directly to
civil society, publishing draft versions of agreements, and providing access, in
some cases, to negotiating delegates. International organizations have created
frameworks that encourage multilateralism and transparency. This has made it
possible for people outside of government to know more than ever before about
what their leaders are doing on their behalf.
As transparency has generally increased, secrecy has become more
noticeable. This appears to be fed by two major factors. First, the institutions that
develop trade policy have gradually moved to create and enforce rules that go
beyond commercial fundamentals.i'" The success of GAIT in establishing low
tariffs and combating protectionism has allowed trade policy thinkers to address
regulatory issues, like intellectual property, labor, and environmental protection,
which were traditionally within the exclusive jurisdiction of individual coun-
tries.286 To achieve these aims, some or all participating nations must change at
least some of their domestic laws. One thing that each of the agreements
described in this article share is that they attracted a motley crew of opponents,
rallied around their common concern about the impact of the agreement on
domestic law.287
284 Covenant of the League of Nations, supra note 43, at art. 18; see also REINSCH,
supra note 17, at 188.
285 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 79, at 634-635.
286 See Hom, Mavroidis & Sapir, supra note 252, at 1566; see also Miles McKenna
& Ian Gillson, TPP & 1TIP: More Questions than Answers, TRADE POST (Feb. 12,
2014), at http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade ("[T]rade agreements are moving beyond
narrow 'GATT-style' agreements to cover deeper issues of trade integration such as
investment, regulations, and services-the'high-hanging fruit' of a well-picked field.").
287 See, e.g., Kobrin, supra note 166, at 98 ("A coalition of strange bedfellows arose
in opposition to the [MAl], including the AFL-CIO, Amnesty International, Australian
Conservation Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, Third
World Network, United Steelworkers of America, Western Governors Association, and
World Development Movement."); John-Thor Dahlburg, Protesters Tell a Different Tale
of Free Trade, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A3 (describing "a motley collection of
activists, academics and private citizens" assembled to protest FTAA talks in Miami);
The Baptist Death Ray, Darrell Issa Does Something Right (Stop ACTA), DAILY Kos,
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/03/08/1072361/-Darrell-Issa-Does-
Something-Right-Stop-Af'TA# (demonstrating unlikely agreement of U.S. liberals and
conservatives on opposition to ACTA); Dave Pruett, Op-Ed., Secret Pact Endangers
US., DAILY NEWS-RECORD (Harrisonburg, Virginia), June 1, 2013 (noting that
opponents of the TPP include the liberal group Public Citizen and the conservative group
World Net Daily).
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A ratified trade agreement today likely means changes in domestic laws
and regulations today and tomorrow; after all, "trade agreements establish
principles that existing and future laws, regulations, and enforcement activities
must satisfy.,,288 Moreover, there is reason to fear that the executive branch may
tum to international law to secure policy changes that have proved politically
challenging at home. 289
Policymakers who believe strongly in the positive impact of free trade
on the global economy often find it perplexing or ridiculous that anyone could
object to efforts designed to increase net global prosperity.t'" They may fall
sway to the belief that if they "share information and consult, 'they'-that is,
NGOs critical of trade policy-will come to understand and accept the official
position.,,291 Many NGOs, however, "refer to this as the 'tell and sell' strategy
and find it unacceptable.Y" In the U.S., there is an expectation that matters
within the ambit of domestic law should be regulated pursuant to the kinds of
open, democratic, and participatory processes that characterize domestic
lawmaking. Information disclosed solely at the government's discretion falls
short of that standard.
Second, the increasing accessibility and sophistication of the Internet
and other technologies has made spreading information and opinions faster and
easier than ever before, certainly more so than anyone could have imagined
when the GATT came into force in 1948. The internet has allowed inter-govern-
mental organizations (like OECD and the WTO) and individual governments to
increase the amount of internal material that they disclose, and to make these
disclosures faster and with greater efficiency. Indeed, the only way to stay fully
informed about trade negotiations, or to review the full text of a concluded
288 Goldman, supra note 79, at 640. Today, the possibility of provisions touching on
digital services and consumer goods seems particularly resonant. As Professor Yu has
described regarding the TPP, "as the negotiations became more intrusive on one's
personal life and as the negotiated agreements began to include provisions concerning the
internet and the digital environment, civil society organizations and the public at large
have begun paying greater attention to the standards included in these agreements." See
Yu, supra note 1, at 1170-1171.
289 See generally Samuelson, supra note 76 (describing the Clinton administration's
attempt to push a controversial digital agenda at a 1996 diplomatic conference in Geneva
that had failed to progress in Congress).
290 E.g., DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 136, at 167 ("OECD
negotiators and officials 'tend to be lawyers and economists who believe free trade is
good for countries and investment liberalization is similarly good. Most trade negotiators
were unprepared for dealing with people who fundamentally opposed what they did. ''')
(quoting USTR negotiator Joseph Papovich).
291 Smythe & Smith, supra note 196, at 47.
292 Id.
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agreement that has not entered into force, like ACTA, is through discerning
internet research.i"
The expectations of civil society groups have grown apace. As demon-
strated during the negotiation of the MAl, NGOs were able to harness the power
of early web-based communication to organize opposition to the agreement. By
publicizing a leaked internal draft of the agreement, the Council of Canadians
and Public Citizen were able to color many first impressions of the text and the
negotiations. In doing so they both initiated a wider conversation about the
agreement and influenced the outcome of that conversation.
The OECD's subsequent efforts to increase transparency and share its
goals for the agreement could not satisfy the demands ofgroups that had come to
oppose it in any form. Similarly, the parties' refusal to publish official draft texts
during the first two years of ACTA's negotiations allowed critics to brand it as
"the secret agreement" and suggest that the participating countries would soon
be cracking down on individuals' digital freedoms.i" Negotiators ended up on
the defensive. Even when a government is proactive about using online plat-
forms to make the case for an agreement, as the USTR has been with respect to
the TPP, it may fare poorly against well-networked and motivated opponents
who are far more prolific.i"
Fundamentally, the definition of 'transparency' has shifted. Post-
negotiation document releases are no longer satisfactory.f" Todays' NGOs are
demanding something closer to real-time information; a virtual seat at the table.
293 By the terms of the Case Act, the Secretary of State is required to send Congress
the text of any international agreement to which the U.S. is a party (other than an Article
II treaty, which would have already been dispatched to the Senate) within 60 days of the
agreement's entry into force. 1 U.S.C. 112b(a) (2012). When an agency, like USTR,
enters into an international agreement on behalf of the U.s. government, it must send the
text of that agreement to the State Department within 20 days of signature. Id An
agreement like ACTA, which has been signed for years but not yet entered into force, is
virtually invisible on the U.S. State Department's website, an otherwise excellent source
for information on international law. Given, also, the significant delays in print
publication of any government documents, the internet is clearly the present and the
future of intemationallegal research.
294 See Yu, supra note 14, at 999.
295 For example, as of July 23, 2014, a Google search for "Trans-Pacific Partnership"
returns the USTR's website as the first hit, but also highly ranks several critical assess-
ments of the agreement from newspapers, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public
Citizen, and other websites, as well as the purloined drafts from Wiki Leaks. Google also
suggests the related search "the trans-pacific partnership global corporate coup d' etat."
296 Smythe & Smith, supra note 196, at 46 ("While the trend is to release greater
amounts of information, partly because the technology permits it makes it cost effective,
public expectations are also increasing. If the release is incomplete or partial, questions
arise and charges of secrecy are heard.").
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Ironically, in the U.S. this push for greater transparency derives in part from
discrepancies in access resulting from the law originally designed to force trade
negotiators to accept input from outsiders. When the Trade Act of 1974 created
the ITAC system, the purpose was to better inform trade negotiators about the
needs of stakeholders affected by trade policy.297
But the privileged access of private advisors, so heavily drawn from
industry, "at earlier stages in the negotiations undercuts any argument by
supporters that the negotiations were transparent because press releases were
issued during negotiations, or because of the late publication oftext.,,298 Corpor-
ate or industry capture speaks directly to the deepest fears of those who oppose
liberalized global trade. Thus, the USTR's online efforts to publicize its goals for
the TPP~reating a dedicated webpage, frequent press releases, and a blog-in
addition to its solicitation of "direct stakeholder engagement," will continue to
disappoint critics as long as such efforts are merely simulacra of the access
afforded to insiders.
In addition to this shift, the transparency conflict is a matter of framing.
The USTR frames its approach to the TPP negotiations with comparisons to
previous bilateral and regional trade agreements, which have historically been
more narrowly tailored and more likely to incorporate sensitive and specific
business information.i'" It also views its approach to trade diplomacy as funda-
mental to the nation's economic well-being, and thereby its national security.
Critics focused on transparency compare wide-ranging agreements like the TPP
to the treaties that regulate non-trade issues, like IP or the environment, which
are more likely to be negotiated in international fora and to .integrate a wider
range of stakeholders into the drafting process.i'"
This makes it difficult to discern which side is actually correct. Consider
how the passage of time has created a counter-narrative about the transparency
of previous negotiations used to support critics' assertions that the USTR is
being regressive. When negotiations around the FTAA came under protest and
were accused of secrecy, a draft of the agreement text was reluctantly
released.r'" The USTR noted that the move was a "big deal" and expressed hope
that the move would appeal to NGOs and help convince critics of the need' for
297 See S. Rep. 93-1298, at 102 (1974) ("[T]he purpose of the procedures provided is
to strengthen the hand of u.s. negotiators by improving their knowledge and familiarity
with the problems domestic producers face in obtaining access to foreign markets.").
298 Weatherall, supra note 228, at 592.
299 See note 50, supra, and accompanying text
300 See note 86, supra, and accompanying text.
301 See section V(C), supra.
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h d 302 B . . d' ht e agreement to succee . ut many cntrcs were not appease , arguing t at
the disclosure was too little, too late.303
But less than a decade after the FTAA fell apart, two directors of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization focused on civil
liberties issues raised by digital technology, favorably compared the trans-
parency process ofFTAA to that of ACTA. 304 Professor Margot Kaminski, in a
critique of ACTA, cited the FTAA to demonstrate the possibility of sharing draft
texts and related materials during negotiations.i'" Professor Peter Yu has
recently made the same comparison with respect to the TPp. 306 Reliance on the
FTAA analogy suggests that there is underwhelming precedent for transparency
in American bi- or multilateral trade deals. But at the same time, there is
evidence of a lack of international consensus about the value of secrecy to
modem trade negotiations. For example, according to (leaked) u.s. embassy
cables, the ACTA talks were criticized by Fabrizio Mazza, head of Intellectual
Property issues at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who found that the
"level of confidentiality in these ACTA negotiations has been set at a higher
level than is customary for non-security agreements" making it "impossible for
member states to conduct necessary consultations" with relevant stakeholders
and legislators. 307
Ultimately, a government's preference for complete control over the
scope and timing of disclosures may be untenable in the age of information. As
Professor Levine has noted, "[t]he existence of the Internet broadly, and
WikiLeaks specifically, only exacerbates the failings of USTR's policy.,,308
When information acquires the status of a leaked secret, it takes on new narrative
dimensions. If strict secrecy is unattainable, it cannot be credited with smoother
and more efficient negotiations, and it does nothing to decrease the interest, and
frustration, of information-seekers who are excluded from the negotiating
process. Even when confidential negotiations culminate in a signed agreement,
secrecy may negatively impact its public reception to the point that threatens the
302 Cooper,supra note 212, at A4; Kennedy, supra note 146,at 128.
303 See Smythe& Smith,supra note 196,at 46.
304 Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement on the Knowledge Economy, 35 YALE 1. INT'L L. ONLINE 24, 31-32 (2009).
305 Kaminski, supra note 7, at 530 n.50.
306 Yu, supra note 1, at 1170.
307 See US Embassy Cables: Italy, the EU, and the Anti-Counterfeit [sic] Trade
Agreement, THEGUARDIAN.COM, Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/-us-
embassy-cables-documents/176810.
308 Levine,supra note 236, at 834.
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viability of the finished product. ACTA is a case in point, and the TPP may soon
be another.i'"
There is still plenty of motivation for negotiators to resist disclosing
draft agreements and incorporating public participation into trade talks. Such
efforts take money and time, increase the burden on trade officials, and add
complexity to the negotiations by requiring some kind of compromise between
narrow commercial interests and broad public prerogatives.i'"
Increasing NGO participation at any stage of negotiations, however,
creates greater total information flows. NGOs may conduct research, solicit
public comment, and publish position papers as part of developing (or resisting)
a trade agenda. NGOs that sit as negotiation observers are in a position to
publicize the talks and supplement (or contest) the official record. NGOs that
accept an invitation to present directly to negotiators, however limited, have a
chance to expand the record, even if just to report on their exclusion. This may
even be a boon to global trade. After all, the expanded role of international and
inter-governmental organizations in treaty negotiations has led to an increase in
the amount of information available to parties that wish to initiate new
agreements.l" More empirical research, more data, and more substantive
information about trade and investment are fuel for policy development.
Conclusion
The case studies described in this article demonstrate that an increasingly
networked world has shrinking tolerance for government secrecy. The rise in
organized opposition to the institutions and agreements that comprise the global
trade regime parallels the expansion of internet access and the explosion of
information online. The trends that give rise to today's conflict over the TPP-the
widening scope of trade agreements and the upward ratchet ofpublic expectations
for transparency-are only going to become more entrenched. In the United
States, the discretion and classification authority vested in the USTR give little
309 See The Trans-Pacific Partnership-No End in Sight ECONOMIST.COM BANYAN
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/-2014/02/trans-pacific-
partnership-O.
31
0 See Smythe & Smith, supra note 196, at 47.
311 Alvarez, supra note 25, at 229. It is also yet to be seen how an information-
restrictive negotiating posture may impact the transparency provisions of any resulting
agreement. Early empirical research suggests a clear correlation between transparency
commitments in regional trade agreements and subsequent higher trade flows. See Iza
Lejarraga & Ben Shepherd, Quantitative Evidence on Transparency in Regional Trade
Agreements, OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 153 (2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/5k450q9v2mg5-en (last visited July 24, 2014).
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latitude for civil society groups to force official disclosures.i" Informal and
subversive methods such as editorial writing, online awareness campaigns,
netroots organizing, and document leaks, can delay and frustrate official efforts to
reach agreement. Until influential policymakers like the USTR modify their
stance towards information-sharing, we should expect future efforts to create
broad agreements on international trade and investment to be slow and difficult.
So, too, will the research process for anyone seeking information about the
development ofthis branch of international law.
312 Note that, however, some continue to press USTR through FOIA. The publishers
of Intellectual Property Watch have sued USTR in federal court seeking disclosure of the
TPP's intellectual property provisions. Complaint, pg. 3, Intellectual Property Watch v.
United States Trade Representative, 13-CY-8955 (S.D.N.Y.), Dec. 18,2013. Disclosure
is urgently needed, the complaint states, "while negotiations are still open, lest the final
terms of the agreement be presented to Congress and the public as a fait accompli." Id at
2. The parties have stipulated to some limitations of the plaintiffs' original FOIA request
and are scheduled to proceed to summary judgment briefing in the fall of2014.
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